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INTRODUCTION
HIS IS a study of the diplomatic assistance extended by the United
States to American nationals investing in foreign countries. It is based
on those official documents relating to American foreign relations in
the twentieth century which have so far been published and thus principally
encompasses the period 1900-1940. It is designed as an inquiry into aspects
of international law which have not often been scrutinized in recent years;
in fact, the scarcity of theoretical analyses of the law of diplomatic protection
is as marked as is, at least in the United States, the abundance of primary
source material awaiting the elaboration of theories and rules of law in the
field.
Although much has been written on the protection that private investment
enjoys or should enjoy under international law, the emphasis has been upon
expositions or analyses of doctrines of international law, or upon plans for
creating protection in the form of multilateral or bilateral investment con-
ventions. No comprehensive survey would seem to have been made for some
time of the protection actually given to investors in the form of diplomatic
support extended by the home government. For this reason alone, an analysis
of diplomatic practice in the field is important.
Evidently, a clarification of United States policy and practice in rendering
assistance through diplomacy to American private enterprise is of considerable
interest. The United States in most respects is the most powerful nation in the
present world; it is difficult for other nations to ignore the attitude of its
Government in any situation. The United States also supplies a very large
share of the totality of international investment. Another reason which
t Another version of this paper is in the process of being published in instalments in
NORDISK TIDSSKRIFT FOR INTERNATIONAL RET (Copenhagen).
I Jur. kand. 1954 University of Stockholm; LL.M., 1958, J.S.D., 1959, University of
Chicago, associated with Wetter & Swartling AdvokatbyrA, Stockholm.
The author wishes to express his gratitude to Mr. Stephen M. Schwebel for advice
in the preparation of this study.
A comparative and more comprehensive analysis of the diplomatic protection of inter-
national concessions will be included in Mr. Schwebel's and the author's book, now in
preparation, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT CONTRACTS.
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has prompted selection of American documentation for this stud, i. that
more is knoxn of United States practice than of the practice of any other
capital exporting nation. due to !iberal rules respecting publication of docu-
ments that are followed by the State Department.
Consideration will be given to several hundred cases in which the United
States Government has given diplomatic assistance in one form or another
to private enterprise investing abroad. It might be contended that these cases
reflect on% vanishing aspects of history and have limited relevance to modem
conditions because of the er" nature of "foreign policy." which in such
large measure experiences constant transformation. This %%ould be a misinter-
pretation of essential characteristics of the source material. A thorough
examination of the cases does not re% eal the application of flexible. of:-chang-
ing policies adapted, ad hoc. to the great %ariety of many-faceted factual
situations that have arisen during.a forty-,ear period. but rather leads to the
discovery of a gradual evolution and theoretical elaboration of doctrines
and rules by the State Department in a fashion more characteristic of the
work of a judicial institution than of the methods commonly (and, in some
cases, erroneously) believed to govern the activities of Ministries of Foreign
Affairs. The State Department is found to ha e acted and to have believed
itself to be acting on the basis of what it sees--in response to dispassionate
legal adv-ice--to be the governing international law. Many aspects of American
foreign policy in this field are thus significantly firm and relatively unchanging.
Indeed, in many respects little change seems to have occurred in the twenty-
year period which has elapsed since the publication of the latest volume of
Foreign Relations. Documents that are released from time to time in disputes
which attract great public attention-such as the recent diplomatic corre-
spondence with the revolutionary Government of Cuba--confirm this impres-
sion.
This inquiry is concerned primarily with those aspects of the material
under review which are relevant to a legal theory of diplomatic assistance
in the investment field. No attempt will be made to assess the statistical or
economic importance of the case law examined. It is believed, however, both
that the instances which have been recorded in Foreign Relations are rep-
resentative and typical and that the accounts rendered of each case are
substantially complete.
Because of the theoretical character of the inquiry, emphasis vill be laid
more upon the delimitation and fixation of opinions as to what is to be con-
sidered permissible, advisable, necessary, or vice versa, than upon the fre-
quency of actions taken, or upon the intensity of any particular instance of
diplomatic interposition.
The subject naturally falls into two parts. One concerns diplomatic assist-
ance in the establishment of investments; Part I of the study examines these
aspects of the subject. Pa,-t II will be devoted to anal% sis of diplomatic activities
designed to protect already existing American economic interests abroad.
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1. DIPLOMATIC ASSISTANCE IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INVESTMENTS
The diplomatic assistance and aid given by the United States to Americans
Investing abroad is and has always been manifold. To the extent that it has
not been directed merely to the dissemination of information and to similar
administrative tasks, it may be said to have inciuded, inter alia, the negotiation
c'f commercial or other treaties with foreign Statas. It is not proposed to deal
.vith such aspects of the activities of the United States State Department
in this study, because to do so would considerably enlarge its scope without
entailing corresponding benefit. Nor shall comments be made upon such
matters as the foreign investment guarantee program which has been under-
taken in recent years, even though this program by now has considerable
practical importance. Attention will instead be focused on concrete diplomatic
interpositions in a strict sense, as exercised, avowedly, in favor of particular
companies or individuals vis-h-vis foreign governments.
A. Survey of the Case Material
American diplomatic assistance of this character has generally fallen within
one of seven distinguishable categories, in most of which the State Department
has sought to attain wider objectives by extending its good offices to American
enterprise.
1. By far the most important group of cases is intimately connected with
the so-called "Open Door policy." This doctrine-which claimed non-
discrimination and commercial equality for American enterprise and finance-
was originally advanced as official United States policy in relation to China
toward the end of the nineteenth century. It is believed that acceptance of
the doctrine resulted from the fear or realization on the part of sectors of the
American business community that, unless the burgeoning domestic economy
were eventually to contract, new markets must be found for the constantly
increasing United States production of manufactured goods and agricultural
products. It is often said that the policy first found expression in two instruc-
tions sent by Secretary of State Hay to the American Minister in China in
1899 and 1900; in fact, an earlier instance of diplomatic assistance to Ameri-
cans desiring to invest in China is a dispatch from Secretary of State Olney
in 1896.2
It must be realized that the Open Door policy was not merely a defensive
action aimed at preventing an exclusive dominance, particularly of British
and French-and, so far as China was concerned, Japanese--economic
interests. In a recent illuminating book on American foreign policy in the
2 FOR. REL. 1897,56. The American Minister in China was instructed to use his "personal
and official influence and lend all proper countenance to secure to reputable representatives
of such concerns the same facilities for submitting proposals, tendering bids, or obtaining
contracts as are enjoyed by any other foreign commerical enterprise in the country....
Broadly speaking, you should employ all proper methods for the extension of American
commercial interests in China, while refraining from advocating the projects of any one
firm to the exclusion of others.-
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twentieth century, Professor W. A. Williams has aptly described the essential
characteristics of the policy in these words:
Discounted in recent years as a futile and naive gesture in a world of
harsh reality, the Open Door Policy was in fact a brilliant strategic stroke
which led to the gradual extension of American economic and political
power throughout the world. If it ultimately failed, it was not because it
was foolish or weak, but because it was so successful. The empire that
was built according to the strategy and tactics of the Open Door Notes
engendered the antagonisms created by all empires, and it is that opposition
which has posed so many difficulties for American diplomacy in the middle
of the twentieth century.
3
Latter-day experts who dismissed the policy as irrelevant, misguided,
or unsuccessful erred in two respects. They missed its deep roots in the
American past and its importance at the time, and they failed to realize
that the policy expressed the basic strategy and tactics of America's secular
and imperial expansion in the twentieth century. When combined with the
ideology of an industrial Manifest Destiny, the history of the Open Door
Notes became the history of American foreign relations from 1900 to 1958.4
While China seems to have remained its main sphere of application in
regard to diplomatic support of American investors,5 the policy of the
Open Door eventually came to play an important role in United States
diplomacy with respect to a large number of countries or territories such as
Albania,6 British India, 7 Kuwait,8 Bahrein,9 Netherlands East Indies,10 Siam,"1
3 WILIAMS, THE TRAGEDY OF AMEIwcAN DIPLOMACY 34-35 (1959).
4 Id. at 39-40.
5 See, e.g., FOR. REL. 1902, 255-62, FoR. REL. 1909, 144-215, especially at 152, 178-79,
1910, 269-91; FOR. REi.. 1909, 70-93, especially at 86, 1910, 353-60; FOR. PL. 1916,
150-210, 1917, 160-207, 1918, 199-209, 1920, 1 679-727; FOR. REL. 1916, 128-50; FOR.
REL. 1921, 1, 404-56, especially at 411-12; FOR. REL. 1935, III, 767-89,. 1936, IV, 600--28,
1937, IV, 658-61. Cf. UNITED STATES RELATioNs WITH CHINA, WITH SPECIAL REFErENCE
TO THE PEmOD 1944-1949,1-4, 10 (Washington 1949). Cf. Editorial Comment, The Integrity
of China andthe 'Open Door,' I AM. J. INT'L L. 954-63 (1907); Editorial Comment, Railways
in China, 4 AM. J. INT'L L. 687-89 (1910); Ching-Chun Wang, The Hankow-Szechuan
Railway Loan, 5 AM. J. INT'L L. 653-464 (1911); Editorial Comment, The Chinese
Railway and Currency Loans, 5 AM. J. INT'L L., 705-07 (1911); Editorial Comment, The
Passing of Dollar Diplomacy, 7 AM. J. INT'L L. 335-41 (1913); Finch, American Diplomacy
and the Financing of China, 16 Am. J. INT'L L. 25-42 (1922).
6 FOR. REL. 1923, II, 17-21, 1924, 1, 753-55; FoR. REL. 1922, 1, 604-09, 1923, 1, 371-97,
1925, I, 493-511.
7 FOR. REL. 1921, II, 71-80, 1922, II, 352-58, 1923, II, 264-71; FOR. REL. 1930, 111,
161-66.
8 FOR. REL. 1932, If, 1-29.
9 FOR. RE.L. 1929, III, 80-82.
10 FOR. REL. 1920, III, 260-91, 1921, II, 528-47, 1928, II, 375-407, 1929, 111, 540-48.
Cf. Reed, Standard Oil in Indonesia 1898-1928, 32 Bus. HISTORY REV. 311-37 (1958),
11 FOR. REL. 1910, 846-48; FOR. REL. 1921, II, 880-89.
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Persia,' 2 the Sudan, 13 and Palestine as well as other Middle East mandate
territories after World War 1.14 Indeed, the United States pressed for recogni-
tion of like principles even in the Americas'; instances are found where the
United States has relied on what amounts to an Open Door doctrine vis-A-vis
Argentina,15 Ecuador,16 Guatemala17 and other Latin American countries.
The Open Door policy was pursued with vigour for many decades. While
originally the diplomatic measures taken were rather restricted, there later
occurred a strengthening of the support in practice, and even in express
declarations of policy. Thus, President Taft summarized the attitude of his
administration in the following words:
The diplomacy of the present administration has sought to respond to
modem ideas of commercial intercourse. This policy has been characterized
as substituting dollars for bullets .... It is an effort frankly directed to the
increase of American trade upon the axiomatic principle that the Govern-
ment of the United States shall extend all proper support to every legitimate
and beneficial American enterprise abroad. 8
2. A second broad type of instance of American diplomatic assistance
in the establishment of investments are those where the United States Govern-
ment has attached considerable importance to the development abroad of one
or another kind of enterprise. Thus, the keen interest shown during certain
periods for cable and radio communications led the State Department to go
almost out of its way in supporting American companies in their efforts
to secure cable or radio concessions in most of South America,19 and at
transatlantic landing points such as Liberia,20 and Portugal (the Azores), 21
or at Pacific landing points in China.22 Again, these activities often produced
clashes with the efforts of British or French companies which were vigorously
supported by their Governments. 23 Another distinct group of cases dates
12 FoR. REL. 1921, II, 640-55.
13 FOR. REL. 1933, II, 845-48.
14 FOR. REL. 1919, II, 250-62, 1920, II, 649-75, 1921, II, 80-94, 1921, II, 94-105, 1922,
II. 333-52, 1923, II, 240-64, 1924, 11, 222-41, 1925, 11, 239-45, 1926, II, 362-70, 1927, II,
816-24, 1930, III, 309-11, 1931, II, 604-11.
Is FOR. REL. 1936, V, 184-200.
16 FOR. REL. 1912, 422-34, 1913, 505-21.
17 FOR. REL. 1927, III, 44-47.
18 49 CoNG. REC. 9 (1912). Cf. on subsequent policy, WILLIAMS, op. cit. supra note 3,
at ch. 4.
19 FOR. REL. 1910, 61-66, 1918, 35-44, 1918, 45-78, 1919, I, 172-83, 1919, 1, 193-204,
1921, 1, 263-65 (Brazil and Argentina); FOR. REL. 1920, 1, 827-32 (Colombia); FOR. REL.
1920, II, 58-69, 1920, II, 686-99, 1921, 1, 808-15, 1921, 1, 815-27, 1922, I, 518-38 (Cuba);
FoR. REL. 1921, II, 666-70 (Peru); FOR. REL. 1929, III, 850-60 (Venezuela).
20 FOR. REL. 1928, III, 254-82.
21 FoR. REL. 1922, II, 359-91, 1923, II, 271-306.
22 FOR. REL. 1930, If, 627-30.
23 See the material referred to above passim and cf. Section B infra.
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from the early history of aviation, when, seemingly because of the national
interest in securing efficient postal services, the State Department extended
substanfial aid to Pan American Airways in negotiations for concessions in
Central and South America,24 in China25 and in Liberia.26 Lastly, after
World War I, it was the endeavor of the United States Government to secure
adequate future sources of supply of o1127-and to some extent other vital
raw materials, such as rubbern--which made it possible for companies
like Standard Oil (N.J.) and Sinclair, or Firestone, to obtain the assistance
of American diplomacy in their concession-seeking activities abroad.
3. A third main category of cases are those where a particularly close
relationship existing between the United States and a foreign country has
come to involve the State Department to a greater or lesser extent in concession
negotiations and in other activities designed to promote American investments
abroad. Among such countries are China until perhaps 1930,29 Liberia,30
24 FoR. REL. 1928, 1, 775-830, 1929, 1, 542-45, 1929, I, 546-652; cf. FOR. REL. 1927,
111,44-47.
2 FoOL Rn. 1933, m, 603-05.
2 6 FOR. REL. 1940, Hl, 756-71.
27 A circular letter from the Secretary of State to diplomatic and consular officers, dated
August 16, 1919, stated, inter ala:
"The vital importance of securing adequate supplies of mineral oil both for present and
future needs of the United States has been forcibly brought to the attention of the Depart-
ment...
"You are accordingly instructed to obtain and forward promptly from time to time
information regarding mineral oil concessions either proposed or granted, sale or transfer
of such conceassia, change of ownership of oil property or important changes in ownership
or control of corporate companies concerned with oil production or distribution....
"You are also instructed to lend all legitimate aid to reliable and responsible United
States citizens or interests which are seeking mineral oil concessions or rights...." Fo.
REi 1919, I. 167.
See on the initiation of this policy Foi. Rn- 1919, 1, 163-71, 1920, 1, 350-70, and for
case illustrations Foo. REL. 1920, 111, 260-91, 1921, 1I, 528-47, 1928, 111, 375-407, 1929,
I, 540-48 (Netherlands East Indies); FoR. REL. 1921, IL 71-S0, 1922, I, 352-58, 1923,
II, 264-71 (British India); FoR. REL. 1921, 11, 547-53 (The Philippines); FoR. Rw. 1922,
I, 604-09, 1923, I, 371-97, 1925,1,493-511 (Albania); Fot. REL. 1936, V, 184-200 (Argen-
tina); Foa. RET. 1929, 111, 80-82 (Bahrein); Fot. Ra. 1932, 1, 1-29 (Kuwait); FoR. REL.
1919, 1, 724-25, 1919, L 726-63, 1919, I, 763-95, 1920, , 823-27, 1921, 1, 638-45, 1922,
I, 974-79 (Colombia).
21 FoR. REL. 1925, H, 367-495, 1926, HI, 503-97, 1927, M, 136-59; cf. FOR. REL. 1933,
IT, 878-966.
29 
ee, e.g., FoR. REL. 1909, 144-215,1910,269-91; FoR. REL. 1909,70-93, 1910,353-60.
30 E.g., Fox. REL. 1914,440-42, 1915,635-42, 1916,458-61, 1917,888-901, 1918,505-47,
1919, 11, 464-504, 1921, 11, 363-93, 1922, 11, 606-38; Fox. REL. 1919, 11, 504-27; Fox.
REL. 1925, II, 367-495, 1926, I, 503-97, 1927, I1, 136-59; Foo. REL. 1937, H, 829-57,
1938, 11, 770-817, 1939, IV, 623-30; Fot. REL. 1940, M, 756-71.
An illustrative statement was made in connection with certain iron ore explorations by
American steel companies in Liberia shortly before World War U1. Secretary of State Hull,
in a dispatch to the American Minister at Monrovia, dated December 13, 1939, wrote
that "the Liberian Government undoubtedly realizes that we consider the development
of Liberia's natural resources of much greater importance than the mere participation of
American concerns in such an enterprise." FOR. REL. 1939, IV, 629.
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Panama,3 1 Cuba in the first quarter of this century, 32 as well as certain
Central American or Caribbean republics, especially at times when the
United States exercised control over their financial affairs.33
4. A primary motivating factor which might at times have prompted
the State Department to lend its support diplomatically to American investors
in their efforts to secure favorable conditions for investments abroad is the
mere importance of the company concerned. This may often have been the
case with the largest American corporations operating abroad, but one
naturally meets with great difficulties in attempting to document this fact,
which generally presents itself only in evanescent overtones.
5. A fifth category, somewhat less clearly perceptible, is the type of case
where diplomatic assistance by the State Department has not seemingly
been motivated by other factors than interest in supporting American enter-
prise generally. It would appear that some instances relating to Persia34
and Afghanistan, 35 as well as a few other isolated cases are of this character.
6. At times, considerations of an entirely different nature have influenced
the United States Government to become involved diplomatically in the
promotion and support of private American investment abroad. While the
cases in point are rather disparate, mention may be made, inter alia, of
actions taken by the United States to prevent German enterprise from gaining
a foothold in Panama3 6 and Liberia37 for military reasons, the interest of the
United States in creating satisfactory sanitary conditions in Cuba38 and
Ecuador,39 and a desire to prevent the Soviet Union from acquiring an undue
interest in Iranian oil fields.40
7. Lastly, diplomatic activities exercised by the State Department in the
promotion of American investments have often been dictated by extraneous
reasons, such as for the purpose of alleviating famine,41 or for other reasons
of a humanitarian character.
31 E.g., FoR. REL. 1912, 1167-206, 1913, 1081-094, 1913, 1094-104; FoR. REL. 1917,
1179-204.
32 E.g., FoR. REL. 1912, 309-22, 1913, 365-69; FOR. REL. 1913, 381-405; FOR. REL.
1913, 369-81.
33 Notably Nicaragua, e.g., FOR. REL. 1912, 1071-105, 1913, 1034-67; and Haiti,
e.g., FOR. REL. 1920, 11, 845-53, 1920, 11, 837-44; FOR. REL. 1923, II, 418-23; FOR. REL.
1924, II, 293-99, 1925, II, 309-15, 1926, I, 429-34.
34 FOR. REL. 1924, II, 552-65.
35 FOR. REL. 1937, 11, 597-604, 1937, 11, 605-14, 1937, II, 734-61, 1938, 11, 752-57.
36 FoR. REL. 1912, 1167-206,1913, 1081-94, 1913,1094-104; FoR. REL. 1917,1179-204.
37 FOR. REL. 1919, II, 504-27; FoR. REL. 1937, JI, 829-57, 1938, II, 770-817, 1939,
IV, 623-30.
3s FoRt. REL. 1904, 247-53, 1905, 265-76, 1920, II, 83-108.
39 FOR. REL. 1912, 422-34, 1913, 505-21.
40 FoR. REL. 1921, I1, 640-55; FoR. REL. 1937, II, 734-61.
41 FOR. REL. 1914, 95-119, 1915, 212-16, 1916, 103-28, 1917, 207-31, 1919, I, 615-26
(China).
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Virtually all of the recorded instances in which diplomatic support has
been extended by the United States Government in the establishment of
American investments abroad follow the general pattern which has been
briefly outlined above. It is not always possible to classify the primary
motivating considerations strictly into any of the seven categories enumerated,
for evidently, in some instances, considerations have overlapped. Granted
these deficiencies in the classification, the scheme nevertheless shows a few
significant and relatively precise features of American diplomatic practice.
B. General Features of Instances of Diplomatic Assistance
A feature of interest is whether interpositions have been negative or positive
in character, Le., whether the State Department has been primarily concerned
with the elimination of existing impediments to American investments, or
whether it has gone beyond this restrictive type of action and has called on
foreign nations to take positive steps to facilitate local establishment of
American enterprise.
In many situations, American diplomatic interpositions have had the
character of protests against proposed or actually effected legislative or
administrative measures which, while not in any way infringing upon existing
American investments, have prevented or threatened to prevent American
enterprise from competing on equal terms with local capital, or with the capi-
tal of other nations. The United States Government's primary purpose in
these cases has been to secure for American firms future access to overseas
markets.
It may suffice to refer here to some monopoly cases as illustrative of this
attitude. The United States has objected to the establishment of oil,42 wol-
fram, 43 and other 44 monopolies in China, and has protested against the
institution of an air transportation monopoly in Guatemala, 45 as well as of
various kinds of oil or petroleum derivatives manufacture or sales monopolies
in Chile.46 Greece,47 Japan and Manchuria,48 Portuga 4 9 and Siam.O It
is notable that the State Department has viewed with disfavor even monopolis-
tic rights granted to American interests.5 1
42 FOR. REEL 1926, 1, 1092-97.
43 FOR. REL. 1933, III, 593-98.
44 FOR. REL. 1935, 111, 767-89, 1936, IV, 600-28, and 1937, IV, 658-61.
45 FOR. REL. 1927, 111, 44-47.
46 FOR. REL. 1932, V, 505-11.
4 7 FOR. REL. 1933, 11, 547-52.
49 FOR. REL. 1933, II, 732-45, 1934, III, 699-799, 1935, I1, 877-939, 1936, IV, 786-
806, and 1937, IV, 723-34.
49 FOR. REL. 1930, 111, 770-77.
50 FOR. REL. 1937, IV, 890-94.
51 FoR. REL. 1926, 1, 1092-97 (China: Standard Oil Company); Fox. REL. 1920, Il.
407-21, at 418 (Poland: American Express Company).
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The cases where the purpose of diplomatic assistance has been to persuade
the government of a foreign nation to take positive action vis-i-vis prospective
American investors have nearly always concerned concessions or other con-
tractual agreements. The State Department has then exercised its influence
in support of efforts of American nationals to obtain, for example, non-
discriminatory treatment of tenders or bids, or the stipulation of favorable
conditions in agreements or concessions with foreign governments. 52
The most interesting feature of diplomatic interpositions of the kind surveyed
thus far is the precise nature and characteristics of the diplomatic actions,
and their actual or desired impact upon foreign governments in concrete
situations, as well as the degree of involvement on the part of the United
States Government.
It must be remarked at the outset that the United States' diplomatic support
to nationals in the establishment of investments abroad has tended to be
comparatively restrictive; more power and vigor has doubtless been brought
into play in those cases where the State Department has exercised diplomatic
protection of already existing investments in foreign countries.
The restraint exercised by the State Department has been such that it
would hardly ever be correct to speak of an actual identification between a
private American investor and his Government. It is difficult to find instances
where, in instructions to diplomatic agents stationed abroad, or in direct
communications with American corporations, the Department has not en-
deavored to draw an exact and clear line of demarcation, indicating the strict
limits of actions which it has been prepared to undertake. There is no doubt but
that the State Department has nearly always desired to maintain a distance
between the Government of the United States and private American corpora-
tions or financial interests, no matter who these have been. This attitude has
found expression in a variety of policies and doctrines which have been
implemented with remarkable consistency.
One may first cite a general reluctance displayed by the State Department
to do more than provide information and introductions, and its view that,
diplomatic representatives having done this much, investors should thereafter
themselves work toward achievement of their objectives. This attitude was,
to mention but one example, taken shortly before World War II vis-A-vis
United States Steel, Bethlehem Steel, and Republic Steel which at that time
were considering exploring iron ore deposits in Liberia. A memorandum
52 See for illustration the general instructions by Secretary of State Knox respecting
Turkey in FOR. REL. 1909,595-96; and FOR. REL. 1909, 144-215, 1910,269-91 (the Hukuang
loan, China); FOR. REL. 1919, 1, 505-55, especially at 525-28 (Continental and Commercial
Trust and Savings Bank of Chicago), 1920, 1, 605-74, especially at 650 (Pacific Development
Corporation, China); FOR. REL. 1922, II, 966-83, 1923, 11, 1198-252 (Ottoman-American
Development Company, Turkey); FOR. REL. 1921, II, 932-41 (Sinclair Consolidated Oil
Company, Venezuela); FOR. REL. 1929, III, 109-21 (radio and telephone concessions in
Greece); FOR. REL. 1929, III, 850-60 (All-America Cables, Venezuela); FOR. REL. 1928,
111, 31-41 (Struma Valley drainage project, Greece); FoR. REL. 1932,11,508-20 (Roumania).
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of a State Department aide of 1938 is indicative of the role assumed by
the State Department:
Our only concern in the matter from the beginning has been to make
equally available to all possibly interested American companies information
at the Department's disposal concerning the opportunity for the exploita-
tion of the iron ore deposits in Liberia. Now that that purpose has been
achieved we have no further direct interest in the question inasmuch as the
matter is now one for negotiation direct between the companies concerned
and the Liberian Government.5 3
While this instance possessed a few rather unique characteristics-such
as the fact that it was the State Department which took the initiative of calling
upon the steel companies to consider the possibility of investing in Liberia-
the views expressed are representative of an attitude which has at times been
vigorously insisted upon by the Department. It has more than once strongly
maintained that the United States will in no circumstances become involved
in commercial aspects of contractual negotiations between an American
investor and a foreign government.
The main consideration underlying this policy is one which in large measure
has shaped American diplomacy in the private investment field: the United
States Government's unwillingness to lend extensive support to any single
American company at the exclusion of other, competing interests. Secretary
of State Hughes once summed up the doctrine with admirable clarity:
In giving appropriate diplomatic support to American enterprise, our
Government does not, of course, attempt to secure contracts for its na-
tionals or to institute particular undertakings. I assume that no one could
wish the Government to be so involved. Its object is to keep open the course
of fair and equal opportunity. Hence, it is a vital principle that it must act
with absolute impartiality with respect to American business interests
which may happen to be in competition. It does not attempt to favor one
at the expense of another, but to maintain such policies with respect to
international intercourse as will give all a fair chance.54
Only a few years later, Mr. Hughes found occasion to restate this policy
of restraint in connection with proposals by the Firestone interests to conclude
concession and loan agreements with Liberia providing for the establishment
of an important rubber industry in that country. In a letter to Mr. Harvey
S. Firestone, Mr. Hughes explained the position of the State Department
in these words:
In reply, I wish to say that I fully appreciate the importance of developing
independent sources of rubber supply under American control, and trust
that your enterprise may contribute to that end. With reference to your
53 FoR. REL. 1938, II, 770-817, at 814.
54 Hughes, Some Aspects of the Work of the Department of State, 16 AM. J. INTr'L L.
353, 357 (1922).
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inquiry whether the enterprise would receive the support of this Depart-
ment, I may state that it is not the policy of the Department of State to
obtain or negotiate concessions for American citizens, although the Depart-
ment is always desirous to maintain free and equal opportunity for Ameri-
can enterprise throughout the world. There appears to be nothing in the
contracts submitted by you which is opposed to the interests or policies of
this Governmept or which would preclude this Department from giving ap-
propriate moral support. It should be understood, of course, that the
Government assumes no obligations and the investment must be made at
the risk of those engaged in the enterprise.5 5
This case, relating to a country with which the United States has always
felt a special affinity, may be classed in a somewhat special category. Yet the
State Department-which at subsequent stages in the negotiations often
looked at matters'more from the point of view of the Republic than from that
of Firestone-to some extent did comment upon the wording of proposed
concession terms.
What has so far been said regarding the exercise of marked restraint
by the State Department in supporting American enterprise diplomatically
does not mean that the United States Government has always been a passive
bystander, even in concrete negotiations between American corporations
and foreign governments. When, for example, Standard Oil (N.J.) in 1921
obtained confirmation of the grant of a fifty-year oil concession in Persia,
the American Charg6 d'affaires in Teheran significantly cabled the State
Department as follows: "May I again urge that the company send immediately
one of its best men to represent it locally as the Legation has already gone
as far as it properly can in pushing this matter through." 56
Other exceptions are found in the diplomatic correspondence with China.
While the vast material on this topic cannot be analyzed here, reference may
55 FoR. REL. 1925, II, 367-495, at 403-04.
It is illustrative to compare this statement with the attitude of the State Department
in the crisis which arose in 1933: see on the latter FOR. REL. 1933, 11, 878-966, especially
at 924-26.
56 FoR. REL. 1921, II, 640-55, at 648. The United States later became even more deeply
involved in this transaction on a high level after the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon,
had maintained vis-a-vis the Persian Government that he considered its grant of the con-
cession "'to be entirely indefensible and extremely unfriendly to His Majesty's Government."
FOR. REL. 1921, 11, 640-55, at 650-51.
An instance similar to the Persian one cited in the text arose in Venezuela in 1929,
when the American Charg6 d'affaires on May 13, advised the State Department, in a
communication concerning negotiations for cable concessions, that "All-America Cables
has lost much valuable time by dilatoriness if not incompetence of its local representatives
until the recent arrival of Vice President Pirie. It may be necessary for the Department to
remind the Venezuelan Government informally that it is interested in seeing an effective
cable service established between the United States and Venezuela and that it believes All-
America Cables in a position to render such service." Secretary of State Stimson replied
that "if you believe such action necessary you may informally remind the Venezuelan
Government as suggested." FOR. REL. 1929, I1, 850-60. at 854.
286 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW [VoL 29:275
be made, for example, to the actions of the State Department in connection
with the Hukuang railway loan negotiations 57 which, in the apt words of
G.A. Finch,
went far beyond, and indeed contravened the foregoing expressions of
previous policy. The official representations made by Secretary of State
Knox and the personal appeal of President Taft made the Government
of the United States virtually a party to the application for the Hukuang
Railway Loan. The initiative of the State Department in the formation of
the American group to participate in the loan made the Government prac-
tically sponsor for the actions of that group in China.58
Despite such exceptions, the dominant impression which emerges from
a study of United States diplomatic practice is a policy of restraint. Perhaps
this is best understood if the attitude of the United States Government,
and the diplomacy practiced by it, are contrasted with the policies adopted
by such other capital-exporting nations of major significance as Great Britain
and France. There is a profound divergence among the three countries with
respect to the extent of diplomatic support offered to their nationals in the
establishment of investments abroad. In fact, American corporations have
on many occasions been placed at a disadvantage as the State Department
has felt bound to refrain from taking steps in support of their projects of a
character which, as a matter of course, has been offered to British and French
competitors by their Governments.
In an illuminating letter from Secretary of State Hughes to President
Coolidge in 1923, this problem was presented in the clear and concise terms
so often employed by that eminent Secretary of State, who has contributed
more than perhaps anybody else to the creation of explicit theories and doc-
trines in this field:
This general question raises a point which I feel to be of sufficient impor-
tance to bring to your attention; namely, the proper attitude of this Gov-
ernment toward American commercial enterprise abroad. From time to
time there has been some dissatisfaction expressed in business circles be-
cause this Department's attitude towards American business interests in the
foreign field differs somewhat from the attitude in similar matters of the
British, French and other European governments. The latter are not loath
to interfere politically in support of the business interests of their nationals
to a degree which is not followed by this Department. Our position is that
we are always ready to give appropriate support to our nationals in seeking
opportunities for business enterprise abroad, but we do not undertake to
make the government a party to the business negotiations or use political
pressure for the benefit of private interests in order to obtain particular con-
cessions, or intervene in favor of one American interest as against another.
We are persistent in our efforts to maintain the open door policy, or equality
57 FoR. REL. 1909, 144-215, 1910, 269-91.
58 Finch, supra note 5, at 28.
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of commercial opportunity, but we do not attempt to assume obligations for
the government, expressed or implied, which under our system we could not
undertake to discharge.
American companies which might prefer a policy of more direct inter-
ference on their behalf by the government are inclined, in my opinion, to
overlook the fact that American prestige and reputation for fairness has
been enhanced, and consequently business opportunities of our nationals
have been increased, by the correct policy which this government has
followed. I find that in many parts of the world American business is wel-
comed largely because foreign countries realize that they can deal with
American interests on a business basis without fearing political compli-
cations.
It is hardly necessary to point out that the other course desired by some
business men, intent on their own immediate interests, would not only
be contrary to our traditions and policy, but if persistently followed would
involve us in political intrigues and in difficulties which other governments
with different exigencies and aims find it impossible to escape and from
which we have happily been free.59
While the diplomatic correspondence of Great Britain and France is not
published to an extent at all comparable to that of the United States, it is
not difficult to find in the pages of Foreign Relations many cases where this
cleavage of opinion among the three nations about the proper limits for
diplomatic assistance of this character has engendered conflict in their mutual
relations.
Mention has already been made earlier in this article of the clashes that
often occurred between British and French cable companies, on the one hand,
and their American competitors on the other hand.0 Another field where
disputes of this kind have not been lacking is that of oil exploration and
exploitation.
In the beginning of the nineteen-twenties, an illustrative case arose in
Albania where a British oil company-The Anglo-Persian Oil Company-and
two American corporations-the Standard Oil Company (N.Y.) and the
Sinclair Exploration Company-were competing for the grant of oil conces-
sions by the Albanian Government. At one point, Secretary of State Hughes
informed the Ambassador in Great Britain that:
The American Charg6 in Albania has informed the Department that it
has been reported that the British Minister has informed the Albanian Prime
Minister that unless the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's contract is accepted
and ratified in its present form during the present session of the Parliament,
which will adjourn on October 13, he would withdraw immediately, by this
action virtually severing diplomatic relations. A previous unconfirmed
report has come to the Department that a threat had been made to the
Albanian Government that if the Anglo-Persian's oil concession were
59 FOR. REL. 1923, II, 711-36, at 717-18.
60 Cf., e.g., FOR. REL. 1920, II, 58-69 and 686-99, 1921, I, 808-27 and 1922, 1, 618-38.
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not granted the capitulations would be reimposed and British support in the
matter of the delimitation of the boundaries of Albania would be with-
drawn. 61
An instance of vigorous action taken by the French Government may
also be cited by way of comparison. In 1932, firms of varying nationality,
among them French and American, were competing for contracts with
Roumania respecting railway signal installations. In the correspondence
relating to representations by the United States Government to the Roumanian
Government concerning discrimination against the American firm, it was
reported by the American Charg6 d'affaires that Roumanian officials-
including the Prime Minister--"freely admitted that the offer of the American
company was the most advantageous one received and... neither of them
made any attempt to deny that the contracts had been awarded to the French
company because of political pressure from the French Government." 62
It may be interesting, lastly, to illustrate the American policy of restraint
by citing a few instances where United States diplomatic representatives
abroad have exceeded the limits of what has been considered appropriate
in rendering diplomatic support to American nationals.
The most explicit illustration which can be found is perhaps the unauthor-
ized assistance extended by the American Ambassador at Madrid in 1924
to the International Telephone & Telegraph Company. While this instance
primarily shows the negative attitude of the United States Government to the
granting of monopolistic privileges to American enterprise-expounded upon
below-it does, by implication, also illustrate the divergent attitudes of the
major Western Foreign Offices to the role diplomacy should play in the private
investment field.
The American Ambassador at Madrid, in August, 1924, reported that:
Exclusive telephone rights in Spain have been given to American tele-
phone interests who were assisted by Embassy inwinning concession which
involves about $8,000,000. Announcement must not be made in United
States but will soon be made from Madrid.63
Secretary of State Hughes replied as follows:
Departmentdesires that appropriate aidbe given to obtain afair andequal
opportunity for American interests, but our Government does not approve
of monopolies. It is against the practice of the Department to aid American
interests in securing monopolistic privileges or concessions which would
61 FO. REL 1923, 1, 371-97, at 394-95. Cf. on previous negotiatio, Fow- REL. 1922
I, 604-09. It should be remarked that the allegations contained in the dispatch quoted in
the text were later denied by the British Government, but there is doubt as to the sincerity
of this denial. See on the diplomatic support given subsequently to the Standard Oil Com-
pany (N.Y.), whose negotiations ultimately resulted in the grant of a concession, FoL REr..
1925, I, 493-511.
62 FoR. REL. 1932, 11, 508-20, at 514.
63 FOR. REL 1924, 11, 692-94, at 692. The telegram has been paraphrased.
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exclude competing American firms, and the Department does not wish to
have its representatives abroad give such assistance. The importance of this
will be appreciated by you as our Government is constantly making protests
to other governments against the giving to nationals of other countries
exclusive concessions.
The Department has made note of your statement that you have aided
certain American telephone interests in winning monopolistic telephone
rights in Spain. Department wishes immediate report on this phase of
matter and complete information concerning the concession granted. 64
Several other distinct features of American diplomatic assistance rendered
in support of the establishment of American investments abroad explain and
shed further light on the policy of restraint which has been described above
as characteristic of the United States. They have crystallized into three specific
policies which would seem to have been adhered to with constancy.
First, there is the perhaps self-evident rule that general foreign policy
considerations have been held to override the interests of particular American
investors. On this ground, it may be remarked, the State Department in at least
two instances has persuaded American corporations to abandon concessions
obtained by them from foreign governments.
The most drastic illustration is perhaps the correspondence that took
place in 1935 with respect to the cancellation by the Standard Vacuum Oil
Company of a concession in Ethiopia upon the advice of the Department of
State. In this instance, "Stanvac" sought the Department's advice as to what
it should do in view of the fact that a concession given by the Government
of Ethiopia to their subsidiary company, the African Exploration and
Development Company, had received world-wide publicity and had oc-
casioned political agitation during the preceding three days. Secretary of
State Hull stated in a dispatch to the American Ambassador to the Court
of St. James's that "the Department officially advised that [the company]
take immediate steps to cancel the contract and Department expressed
a favorable opinion of a draft statement which [the company's] representatives
had prepared giving the history of the concession and adding a declaration
of their intention to cancel it."65
6FoR. REL 1924, II, 692-94, at 693. The telegram has been paraphrased.
In subsequent dispatches, the American Ambassador, obviously hurt, explained that
the choice on the part of the Spanish Government had been restricted to the American or
the Swedish telephone system and that he "naturally thought that American system would
be favored by the Department. My assistance consisted in informing Spaniards that Ameri-
ican business interests always knew how to carry out big projects and that the American
telephone system was not equaled anywhere. In the future I shall make no recommendations
before receiving instructions from the Department." Id. at 693. Secretary of State Hughes
replied that "of course Department wishes appropriate support to be given American
interests. The point made was regarding efforts to obtain an exclusive concession. Depart-
ment wishes complete information on this point so that nature and extent of monopolistic
privileges may be understood." Id. at 694.
6s FOR. REL. 1935, I, 778-84, at 781.
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In this instance, the recommendation of the Department of State sprang
from the international tension which surrounded Ethiopia at that time, and
from the United States' desire not to do anything that might cast doubt
on its removed position in the international conflict that had developed over
Ethiopia.
Another case in point is the refusal of the State Department, in 1921 and
1922, to lend diplomatic support to the Sinclair Consolidated Corporation
in its endeavors to secure a prospective oil concession in the northern portion
of the island of Sakhalin for the reason that:
the Government of the United States has not recognized the so-called Far
Eastern Republic, from which it is understood that the concession in
question would be received. Having regard to this fact, and to other uncer-
tainties in the situation, the Department cannot at this time encourage
you to proceed to the conclusion of definite engagements."6
Similarly, *military considerations have influenced the United States Gov-
ernment to take a particularly restrictive attitude vis-i-vis American investors
seeking its diplomatic support abroad.67
Lastly, mention may be made of .the fact that it was for some time the
policy of the United States to object to the granting of private American
loans to foreign countries until these countries' debts to the United States
Government had been settled. 68
There are two further policies which in important respects have shaped
and given clear direction to the American restraint in offering diplomatic
assistance to prospective investors.
It has been noted that the United States has invariably insisted upon
" FoR. REL. 1923, II, 798-812, at 799. As the company nevertheless did proceed and
eventually was granted a concession, Secretary of State Hughes later pointed out to the
company that "you will readily understand that it is impossible for this Government to take
official cognizanze of a contract which purports to have been condluded with a government
which has not been recognized by the United States, and to make it the subject of diplomatic
representations to another government.'" Id. at 805. Cf. on the subsequent cancellation of
the oil concession in Northern Sakhalin and on the refusal then by the Department of
State to intervene in behalf of Sinclair, FoR. REL. 1925, 11, 697-701; cf. FoR. REt. 1924,
I, 678-41.
6 7 See, e.g., on certain railway and road construction concessions in Panama, FoO.
REL. 1917, 1179-204; cf. the previous instances recorded in Foa. REL. 1912, 1167-206,
1913, 1081-104. An instance of a somewhat unique character is referred to in FoR. REL.
1927, Il1, 499-518, where the United States actually objected to the granting by Panama
of a proposed concession to a subsidiary of the United Fruit Company providing for the
building of radio installations in that country. Here the United States in fact asserted
its own rights under a concession granted to the Panama Railroad Company, owned by the
United States Government.
6s See, e.g., FOR. REL 1925, 1I, 358-63 (Italy); Foa. REL. 1925, 11, 738-46 (Yugoslavia).
A somewhat different consideration is referred to in FOR. REL. 1922, 11, 1002-20, where
the State Department displayed initial reluctance to acquiesce in a loan by American
bankers to the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on account of the fact that the
Yugoslav Government had not as yet settled a claim by the Standard Oil Company. See
id., at 1009 n.5.
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the rule that it is unable to render diplomatic support to any one American
company to the prejudice of competing American interests. This, of course,
has been a consequence of respect for essential principles inherent in the
American free enterprise system. With it has been joined another similar
rule, which springs from official American policy towards monopolies.
A doctrine has been evolved to the effect that American companies seeking
monopolistic rights abroad are not entitled to support by American diploma-
cy. The instance cited above where the American diplomatic representative
in Spain was rebuked for having assisted the International Telephone &
Telegraph Company in obtaining an exclusive telephone concession in Spain
illustrates this attitude.69
In a State Department report of a meeting held in 1938 in connection with
negotiations then going on regarding iron ore concessions in Liberia, the
competitive disadvantages resulting to American business from the anti-
monopoly policy were discussed, and a number of instances were cited where
the doctrine was said to have entailed detrimental consequences. The following
quotations from the report are illuminating:
[Mr. Murray described to representatives of United States Steel] what
had occurred in Persia when two American companies had endeavored to
obtain an oil concession from the Persian Government several years ago.
Owing to the fact that the Department could not support one American
concern to the exclusion of another, it had not been able to enter the lists
and afford appropriate diplomatic support as it would have been in a
position to do if there had been a single representative American interest at
stake. One of the competing concerns, moreover, had effected a tieup with
British interests which had brought with it British diplomatic assistance,
whereas the Department was compelled to remain neutral and impartial
throughout the negotiations. The result was that the Persians had played off
one American concern against the other, the companies had fought each
other to a standstill, and neither one obtained the concession.
Mr. Murray next related what had taken place in Iraq when oil reserves
had been opened up in that territory after the War. Under British mandate,
there had been a disposition at first to restrict the exploitation of petroleum
to those nations who had ratified the Treaty of Versailles or were members
of the League of Nations, but we had insisted on the principle of the open
door and had obtained equality of opportunity for American concerns.
Instead of competing one against the other, six interested American com-
panies had formed a group known as the Near East Development Cor-
poration, the members of which had entered the fields successfully and
worked in harmony together with everyone's satisfaction. More recently,
Mr. Murray went on, two American companies had become attracted by
69 Again, reference may be made to the general policy statement by Secretary of State
Hughes quoted supra at note 54, and to the instances referred to supra note 51, where the
State Department looked with disfavor upon exclusive rights obtained by the Standard
Oil Company in China, and upon monopolistic features in an agreement concluded by the
American Express Company with the Government of Poland.
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new oil reserves near Basah and had been advised by the American
Minister Resident in Baghdad to pool their interests and thus avoid the dan-
gers and uncertainties of competitive negotiations? 0
The remaining doctrine is of vastly greater importance than the foregoing.
In general, it can be said to consist of a refusal to commit the United States
in advance with respect to protection of an investment, once established. An
examination of instances where this doctrine has been applied will explain
much of what has been said above on the attitude of restraint and on the
reasons which have been at the root of this policy.
As has been intimated, the reluctance of the State Department to lend
active and vigorous assistance to American nationals, in contrast with the
practice of some other governments, has stemmed from fear that this might
imply a commitment on the part of the United States Government to later
protect the investments in question against future actions by the government
of the foreign country. American Secretaries of State have almost invariably
stated that they lack power to bind their successors in office by giving assur-
ances to such an effect. Among the many instances where this policy of the
Department of State has been made clear to American investors, one may
be cited which gives a concise summary of its purport.
In 1924, Mr. Harvey S. Firestone, then about to conclude a concession
with the Liberian Government, submitted draft agreements to the Secretary
of State "with the request that the State Department advise us if they contain
anything that would prevent the United States Government from giving this
development, if entered into, its moral support and approval, and also give
me any opinion or advice you see fit as regards the protection afforded the
rights of both parties from a contractual and international standpoint."71
At a subsequent meeting in Washington, the Secretary of State is reported
to have given Mr. Fi'restone the following reply:
In examining the papers before him, the Secretary had found certain allu-
sions to protection and support in the future. The Secretary would not and
could not commit his successors in office in such a matter. He could,
however, state that it was the historic policy of the Department to lend
proper support of a diplomatic character to the just claims of its citizens.
Each claim as presented was considered on its merits, and if found to be well
founded in justice the Department took such action as was appropriate
to the occasion. It should be clearly understood that there was no question
of resort to force. It was a matter of appropriate diplomatic supportL In
this connection, the Secretary wished to emphasize the fact, which he hoped
70 Foa. REL. 1938, 11, 770-817, at 806. Cf. on another instance of implementation of the
doctrine, 3 WifimAN, DAmuTs IN INT TIONAL LAW 1564-65 (1943). The relation
of such advice to subsequent antitrust action undertaken by the United States Govenmnent
against the major American petroleum companies with international interests poem an
interesting question.
71 Fo. REL. 1925, 1I, 367-495, at 384-85.
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Mr. Firestone would appreciate, that the Secretary could give no different
assurance in the case of Liberia than he could give in a similar case with
respect to any other country. 72
The instances are too numerous to cite in which this doctrine has been
applied, directly or indirectly, before and after 1924. It should not be denied,
however, that on special occasions the United States may have become in-
volved in particular negotiations to a degree which in fact, if not in theory,
has amounted to a virtual endorsement of particular contracts and an implied
moral obligation vis-A-vis the American investor to object to possible future
interference with or nonfulfilment of such contracts by the foreign government
concerned. An explicit guarantee of this nature has, however, to the writer's
knowledge, only been given once, and then in special circumstances and with
an express proviso regarding the limited extent of future diplomatic assist-
ance.
73
The United States State Department thus having consistently refused to
give any guarantees in express terms of future diplomatic protection of Ameri-
can investments, no question has ever arisen as between an American national
and his Government as to the meaning and extent of an obligation of this
character.74 However, in the debate concerning the status under international
law of concession agreements concluded between States and aliens, the question
has recently been asked whether, because, inter alia, of the active support
often given in diplomacy to corporations which eventually obtain such
concessions, these contracts "arguably may be viewed as instruments of an
international character whose violation does give rise to a violation of
72 FOR. REL. 1925, 1I, 367-495, at 386.
73 1n 1914, John Basset Moore, in his capacity of Chairman of the International Relief
Board of the American National Red Cross, wrote to President Wilson in connection with
a river conservation project in China, where the Red Cross had undertaken to secure
an American contractor to perform the work. Mr. Moore wrote as follows:
"I therefore trust that you will pardon me for referring to my letter of the 26th ultimo
and particularly to the question therein propounded as to whether the Government of the
United States will give assurance of good offices and diplomatic support in behalf of the
American contractor should he be able to agree with the Chinese Government on fair and
equitable terms," FOR. REL 1914, 105.
President Wilson replied:
"I am sincerely glad to hear that the Chinese Government has consented to act through
the International Relief Board of the American Red Cross in the matter of the conservation
of the river waters of China, and I hasten to write not only to express my gratification
but to say that, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, I shall be very glad indeed
to have it understood that the Government of the United States will give assurance of good
offices and diplomatic support in behalf of the American contractor should he be able
to agree with the Chinese Government on fair and equitable terms. Of course, it is no longer
necessary to explain that these good offices would not go to the extent to which some
Governments have gone in seeking to enforce the rights of their nationals in the matter
of contracts." Ibid.
74 Cf. DOEHRING, DIE PFLICH-r DES STAATES ZUR GEwkmuNG DIPLOMATISCrEN SCHUZES
(1959).
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international law." 75 Since the State Department's facilitation of the negotia-
tion of concession agreements has been restricted, and its actual involvement
in negotiations for the conclusion of concessions quite exceptional, it may
be said that support for such a thesis in American practice is modest. More-
over, the State Department's refusal to commit itself to diplomatic protection
in the future may be argued to detract from the impact in international law
that its role in the negotiatory process may be said to generate. This latter
argument, however, is weakened in turn by the consideration that a govern-
ment is never legally bound to intervene diplomatically on behalf of its
nationals; the question of diplomatic intervention always remains one of
its political discretion and diplomatic appreciation. With respect to the-thesis
that the involvement of the government of the investor in the granting of a
concession strengthens the case for applying the protection of international
law to the transaction, the experience of Great Britain and France is of greater
relevance, for, as noted, these countries have. characteristically exerted diplo-
matic pressure on behalf of their nationals in this sphere. It will furthermore
become apparent from Part II of this.study that a large number of American
diplomatic interpositions made in protection of concessions held by American
nationals indicate that often in practice violations of concession agreements
in certain circumstances have been considered to give rise to violation of
international law.
II. DIPLOMATIC ASSISTANCE IN THE PROTECTION OF INVESTMENTS
There are significant contrasts between the diplomatic support extended
by the United States in protection of established investments and the assistance
rendered to prospective investors in the process of acquiring economic inter-
ests abroad. The first part of this paper has demonstrated that in situations
of the latter kind the State Department has in large measure evidenced a gen-
erally restrictive attitude, flowing from such considerations as official anti-
monopoly policy, the principle of affording equal opportunity to competing
American interests, and reluctance to involve the United States too directly
in concrete business negotiations with foreign governments for fear of ham-
pering the Government's freedom of action in the future.
The various motives which have thus imposed restraints on: United States
diplomacy in relation to support in the establishment of investments do not
have the same relevance in situations where an existing investment needs
protection against acts of a foreign government. Once an American citizen
possesses vested rights abroad which are exposed to danger of politically
motivated loss or unwarranted interference, the national interest will-absent
strong reasons to the contrary-normally coincide with that of the investor.
That is why it is not surprising, as we turn to this phase of the subject, that
the records reveal a vigorous, flexible foreign policy which, although displaying
75 Schwebel, International Protection of Contractual Arrangements, Proceedings of the
American Society of International Law 266, 267 (1959).
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some individual features which may be termed typically American, has
close resemblance to the practice of the great European powers.
Evidence for this thesis is manifold. First, United States diplomatic
theory has not clung to any narrow formula respecting the nature or form
of investments deemed worthy of support: the United States Government has
deemed itself justified in intervening in support of various economic interests
of its citizens. Secondly, the nature of the actions taken by foreign govern-
ments has had limited importance so long as unwarranted interference has
been established. Thus, it is not the form but the effect of measures instituted
by foreign governments which has been judged to be important. Again, the
United States has not regarded it as necessary to await the occurrence of
actual damage or loss but has intervened even in the early stages of incidents
where action by a foreign government has only been threatened or proposed.
This part of the study seeks particularly to examine those characteristics
of United States diplomacy which give rise to these general conclusions.
After an introduction to the nature of the interests protected, the main types
of diplomatic interpositions will be analyzed. The following section is devoted
to an exposition and critical appraisal of the formal grounds of interposition,
particularly with respect to claims originating in disputes concerning invest-
ment contracts or concessions concluded between American nationals and
foreign governments; some other significant legal issues, such as the time
when interpositions may be made, will also be discussed in that context. There-
after, the question of remedies will be examined. The study ends with a
summary of the main conclusions which can be drawn from the foregoing
presentation.
A. Nature of Protected Interests76
Most foreign holdings of American nationals reportedly are equity invest-
ments in the sense that the vested economic interests are represented by shares
in foreign subsidiary corporations. This circumstance has often given rise
to the difficult problem of ascertaining whether satisfactory formal grounds
for interposition have existed in respect, for example, to claimant's nationality;
that question, however, can not be discussed in this context.
A survey of the many hundreds of known instances in which interpositions
have been made by the United States during the half-century under considera-
tion to protect investments abroad justifies the conclusion that any American
economic interest abroad is as such entitled to be protected by the United
States Government. There is accordingly no need to describe the numerous
types of business interests which have been the object of diplomatic inter-
position.
It would seem to be only in two areas that the nature and form of an
investment has exerted any influence on the attitude of the United States
Government towards the question whether diplomatic protection should be
76 Cf. 2 WHITEMAN, op. cit. supra note 70.
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given. First, and foremost, is the thesis that claims based upon concessions
and similar contractual undertakings with a foreign government fall into
a special category. This theory is of such importance that a large part of this
study will be devoted to analysis and reappraisal of its validity. (See under
C infra.) Secondly, and less importantly, it has once been questioned in
a compensation claim for forced government appropriation of private proper-
ty whether certain intangible business assets ought properly to be included
in the demand for a financial settlement. In the Spanish Petrolewn Monopoly
case,77 this problem was extensively considered in a series of diplomatic
dispatches relating particularly to compensation demanded for the properties
and assets of a Spanish subsidiary of Standard Oil (N.J.)--Industrias Babel
y Nervoin7T-which were expropriated by the Spanish Government. Thus,
in 1927, the Ambassador at Madrid asked for instructions about whether
he should press diplomatically for compensation "for value of going concern
and business goodwill," 79 and while Secretary of State Kellogg originally
stated that this problem must be dealt with on an in casu basis,0 the United
States subsequently joined the French Government in interpositions aimed
at securing compensation for gooidwill and going concern value.8 ' The
French Government's firm stand on the principle of "fair" compensation
for goodwill was later emphatically endorsed by Secretary of State Kellogg,8Z
and eventually Standard Oil (N.J.) obtained what the company seems to
have regarded as a satisfactory indemnity amounting to about 25 per cent
for goodwill over and above the physical valuation of the property.8 3
The policy adhered to in the Spanish Petroleum Monopoly case illustrates
the fact that-as may seem natural to an outside observer-the widest range
77 FoR. REL. 1927, HI, 655-714, 1928, III, 832-78 and 1929, I1, 768-88.
78 The correspondence concerned primarily this company..However, it is illustrative
to note that the Vacuum Oil Company and the Atlantic Refining Company had "built
up an excellent business as selling agents but with practically no physical assets to sell,
their trademarks, good will and selling organization being their only assets," Ambassador
Hammond to Department of State on October 24, 1927, FoR. REL. 1927, 111, 677. This
fact seemingly did play an important role in the early stages of the dispute.
79 FOR. REL. 1927, I1, 674. "Earning power" was later also included.
so "From what precedes you will perceive that the question of compensation for 'good
will' is necessarily one upon which the Department can take no position except as each
specific case of expropriation arises." Fo. REL. 1927, I1, 681-82.
The intentionally vague wording of the first notes of protest, as prepared in Washington,
accordingly spoke of "full and fair compensation to all American interests concerned by
which is meant the fair value oftheproperty taken over and such damages as may reasonably
be considered to have resulted to other property by reason of the taking." Secretary of
State Kellogg, FoR. REL. 1927, 1m, 683; text of note id. at 693.
81 On facts and figures, see especially Ambassador Hammond's dispatch of May 23,
1928, FOR. REL. 1928, I, 861.
82 See Secretary of State Kellogg's report on a conversation with the French Foreign
Minister, FoR. REL. 1928, 11, 875.
83 See Ambassador Hammond's dispatch of May 9, 1929, FoR. REL. 1929, I1, 781.
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of economic interests of American citizens abroad enjoy diplomatic support.
This is a liberal feature of the practice which has significance because it places
in proper perspective the restraint and restrictiveness which, it is sometimes
contended, characterizes American diplomacy in many areas besides that of
assistance to prospective investors.
B. Nature and Degree of Protection Extended: Scope
and Principal Types of Interpositions
The theory may be advanced, and in fact underlies this study as an implicit
assumption, that diplomacy ends where judicial process begins. Thus, action
taken by the State Department and by its staff abroad will be described as
diplomatic only until the point where a dispute becomes formally crystallized
into legal issues and submitted for judicial or quasi-judicial consideration or
decision. At that stage, the representation of the United States is often
entrusted to special officers-at times private law firms retained for a single
occasion-and matters are handled in so different a manner from what is the
usual custom that one can no longer regard the arguments advanced and the
action taken as an expression of either the practice or the policy of the
United States Government. It is mainly for this reason that the present study
does not consider briefs and arguments prepared by agents of the United
States in arbitrations between it and foreign countries, or presented to claims
commissions established by treaty, and similar material.
On the other hand it is clear-and this fact indeed lends general scholarly
as well as practical significance to the material under study-that interpositions
made by the United States in concrete instances must be regarded as based
on what the United States Government considers to be international law,
since evidently the State Department would not advance or press claims diplo-
matically which it regards as legally unfounded. One might therefore contend
that the distinction between diplomacy and law just referred to is invalid,
or at least is less convenient to adopt because it excludes from analysis those
instances which have resulted in judgments that sometimes constitute essential
contributions to public international case law. Consideration must however
be given to the fact that statements made in formal legal claims are merely
contentions and arguments whose significance is diminished for the very
reason that a judicial pronouncement of a higher order eventually supersedes
them.
Furthermore, diplomatic claims, as defined above, have the peculiar
dual quality both of being based on international law as understood by
claimant government, and of being generative of customary international law,
so that the interpositions, particularly if accepted by respondent government,
also may constitute evidence of what the law actually is. This circumstance
is particularly important to observe in relation to the practice of the Govern-
ment of the United States; the submission that its actions must be accorded
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substantial importance for determining the status of customary international
law in the area of foreign investment needs no explanation.
If, in addition, it is recognized that, while at least the judicial pronounce-
ments made in arbitrations, etc., to which the United States has been a party
are well known, there exists a vast number of cases which have never gone
beyond the diplomatic stage, and which are both relatively unknown and
highly interesting, the reasons for a distinction between diplomatic claims
and legal claims will be apparent.
1. Armed Intervention. Nineteenth century diplomatic records are replete
with accounts of how the military power of capital-exporting nations-and
among them the United States-has been brought to bear upon the attitudes
of small capital-importing nations in disputes concerning private investments.
In this century, however, the United States has been loath to resort to force
and has indeed never done so exclusively to protect American foreign in-
vestment.
Other nations have not been similarly disposed. The bombardment and
subsequent blockade by Great Britain, Italy and Germany--against the
wishes of the United States-of certiin Venezuelan cities beginning in 1902
may be recalled by way of contrast. 84
In the arbitration that followed on the question whether the claims of the
blockading powers against Venezuela should be accorded preferential treat-
ment over those of other creditors, the British Attorney General, Sir Robert
Finlay, made the following pronouncement on the justifications for the war-
an advocate's masterful argument which, if it be viewed as an expression of
official policy, well illustrates the divergent political philosophies of Great
Britain and the United States in matters of this kind:
All nations are equal. The obligations of international law are for the
weak as well as for the strong, and no doctrine can be imagined more likely
to imperil the peace of the world than that, on account of its weakness,
any nation should be supposed to enjoy immunity from the discharge of
those international obligations which are incumbent upon all countries,
whether they are powerful or whether they are weak. It is always a thank-
less and an ungrateful task for a great power to have to impose respect for
international law upon a weak power. That task on this occasion fell to the
lot of Great Britain, in alliance with Germany and with Italy; in the asser-
tion of their own rights they were compelled to have recourse to coexcive
measures. 85
84 Cf. Hershey, The Venezuelan Affair in the Light of International Law, 51 AM. L. REo.
(1903); Basdevant, L'action coercitive Angleo-Germano-Italienne contra la Vinizuela, REv.
GAN. DE DROIT INT. PuBLC (1904); GACut, LE CoNFLiT VENBzuELEN ET L'ARBiTRAGE
DELA HA (Thse, 1905); MALLAis, L'ARBnnRAGE VENzua~urE DEvArN LA CouR DE LA
HAYE (1903-1904).
85 Quoted from the record of the Hearings on November 2, 1903, in PENIELI, THE
VENEzUEtAN ARBITRATION BEFORE THE HAGUE TRIBUNAL 1903, 1199 (1905).
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In t-e samu year, Engtand, Francc, Germany and Thliznin coder ,c
bring aoout payment of bonds held by their citizens used collective coercive
pressure against Guatemala. The American Charg6 d'affaires then reported
that
it appears that they [the diplomatic representatives of claimant countries]
as a body notified [the Government of Guatemala] that if arrangements
were not made to satisfy their respective creditors on a specific date a man-
of-war would take possession of each of the principal ports of the Republic
of Guatemala.8 6
In this case as well, the United States, while acknowledging the right of the
European nations to intervene-this was before the Hague Conference of
1907 inspired by Dr. Drago and the resulting Convention of the same year-
declined to take part in the action.8 7
It may be remarked, lastly, that none of the military interventions which
have in fact been made by the United States-and particularly in the first
decades of this century where this might be suspected-have been undertaken
exclusively as a measure of protection for private American investments.88
86 FoR. REL. 1902, 579.
87 Ibid. Cf. Hershey, The Calvo and Drago Doctrines, 1 Am. J. INT'L L. 26, 37 (1907).
In 1913, Britain dispatched a warship into Guatemalan waters in order to exert pressure
on the Government in a dispute concerning the payment of bonds held in Great Britain which
were guaranteed by a coffee tax the proceeds of which the Guatemalan Government allegedly
diverted to other uses. The United States in this instance was asked to lend its good offices,
but the views of the United States and Great Britain differed as to how a solution should
best be accomplished. The insistence of the British Government upon seeking United States'
support for its claim that the bonds be converted was severely criticized by Secretary of
State Knox who for reasons given characterized Great Britain's stand to be inconsistent
"with even an ordinary regard for the broad interests and policies of the United States."
FOR REL. 1913, 558-59. The British Government stated in reply that "whilst deeply regret-
ting that the United States Government feel unable to join them in requesting the Guate-
malan Government to refer the question to arbitration, [the British Government] have
no option but to adopt such measures as may be best calculated to obtain satisfaction from
the Guatemalan Government" (id. at 567), and it was subsequently reported that the British
Minister stated to the President of Guatemala "that if the coffee revenues are not restored
to the bondholders within two weeks he will telegraph to his Government for a warship,
will then leave, breaking off diplomatic relations and his Government will adopt the neces-
sary measures to collect the coffee revenues." Id. at 568.
Again, shortly after World War I, Great Britain became involved in a dispute with the
Government of Costa Rica concerning claims which were eventually resolved in the well
known arbitration on the Aguilar-Amory and Royal Bank of Canada claims (I UNRIAA
371 with appertaining references). In the process of securing the approval of the Government
of Costa Rica to referring the dispute to arbitration, the British Government is reported
to have acted as described by the United States Charg6 at San Jos6 in a dispatch of November
15, 1921:
"British Minister delivered note dated November 8th to the Minister for Foreign Affairs
respecting Amory petroleum and Royal Bank of Canada claims which is virtually an ul-
timatum. British war vessel due today at Puerto Limon probably for the purpose of lending
weight to note." FOR. REL. 1921, I, 666.
88 It is true that the interventions made in the Dominican Republic in 1907 and Haiti
in, 1915 resulted in the establishment of control over the financial affairs of those countries,
aimed in large measure at satisfying foreign debts, and that this control included setting
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2. Severance of Diplomatic Relations. In disputes concerning private foreign
investments, the discontinuance of diplomatic relations must be regarded
as a serious step ranking almost next to armed intervention. The United
States has resorted to this measure at least once vis-i-vis Venezuela when
serious disagreement had developed between the two nations regarding
laims of American citizens against the Venezuelan Government. The prin-
cipal reason given for the move was "the persistent refusal of the present
Government of Venezuela to give redress for the governmental action by
which substantially all American interests in that country have been destroyed
or confiscated, or to submit the claims of American citizens for such redreu
to arbitration. . .. "89
3. Economic and Political Sanctions and Other Coercive Actions. It may be
stated in general terms that, just as the United States has refused to make
armed interventions to enforce claims relating to private American foreign
investment, the Government has only rarely, and then reluctantly, resorted
to economic or political sanctions of comparable weight in disputes of that
character. Thus, the policy has consistently been applied of not taking en-
up of receiverships over their customs houses, an arrangement which in the case of the
Dominican Republic was maintained during 1907-1924. However, the interventions do
not appear to have been primarily motivated by a desire to protect private American
investments so much as to save the countries from ruin and from undue exploitation by
European powers, the latter in pursuance of President Roosevelt's corollary to the Monroe
doctrine enunciated in his message to Congress on February 15, 1905. The intervention
in the Dominican Republic, furthermore, was made pursuant to a treaty signed between
its Government and the United States on February 8,1907. See with respect to the Domini-
can Republic, 2 WELLE , NABorn's Vni-YAxz:'TbE DoMIcIAN Rm, mmc 1844-1924
645 (1928); the general study, TEu UNIro STATES AND THE DomimcAN REItmuc, published
for the Catholic Association for International Peace; on Haiti, FOrt. REL. 1915, 475-76,
479-480.
89 FoiL REL. 1909, 610. Cf. Foi. RE. 1908, 774-830.
It may be recalled that in the dispute between France and Venezuela concerning the
abrogation of a cable concession held by the Compagnie Frangaise de Cables T6l6graphi-
ques, diplomatic relations were severed between the two countries for seven years (i.e.
between 1906 and 1913). See on this case the Venezuelan Government's publications:
VENEzUEL., FRANcE AND TE FRENCH CABLE Co., EurroRmIL ARTic s OF "EL CoNsrrru-
cio '," DnLomric CoRREspoNmENc, ExTRAcrs PFRoM Tf LEGAL PkoczEDINGS (1906);
VENEzuELA Y LA CoMPANA FkANcEsA DE CABLEs TELEGRAFiCOS, Rumoso PRocEso, Docu-
MENTOS PUBLICADOS EN "EL CoNs=rrrucIoNL" (1905); SAUVAGE, TuE F.ENcu CABLE
COMPANY (COMPAGNIE FRANCAISE DE CABLE TELEGRAPQmQUES) AND Tu VENEzUELAN
REVOLUTION OF 1902-1903; RoUvRAY, LA FRANCE & LE VENEZUELA MiS Au Ponrr (1906);
Cf. also FOR. REL. 1929, I1, 850. See on resumption of diplomatic relations the protocol
of 1913, 1 LmRo AmAmLuo (VENEZUELA) 525-33 (1915) and EL PROTOCOLO VENEZOLANO-
FRANCES DE 1913 (1915).
The differences between the Venezuelan Government and the Compagnie Franaise
de Cables T6lgraphiques were settled.in 1909 in two agreements entitled "Convenio de
11 do mayo de 1909 celebrado entre el Procurador General de la Naci6n y la Compafia
Francesa de Cables Telegrdficos para ponertr tmino a los asuntos y reclamaciones pendientes
entre los Estados Unidos de Venezuela y dicha Compafila" and "Contrato de 11 de mayo
del1909 celebrado entre el Ministro de Fomento y el Representante de la Compafia Francesa
de Cables TelegrAficos!' , No. 10.577 and 10.578, respectively. (Information graciously
supplied to the writer by the Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Venezuela).
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forcement measures except upon extreme provocation. Here, as well, there
is a distinct divergence between the attitudes of the United States and the
great European powers.
Instances have not been lacking where the claims concerning government
appropriation of or interference with American investments have seriously
disrupted the relations between the United States and foreign nations. It is
well known in this regard that relations with Mexico were strained for many
years due to a disagreement on the proper limits of the Mexican Government's
freedom of action in regard to American economic interests in that country.90
As a graphic illustration of the thesis, it may however be of greater interest
to cite a less notorious dispute which originated in an attempt by the Govern-
ment of Spain to annul an exclusive telephone concession held by The
International Telephone and Telegraph Company and in subsequent other
actions taken by the Spanish Government which seriously interfered with the
affairs of that company. 91 When pressing for a satisfactory solution of out-
standing questions after years of fruitless efforts to that end, Secretary
of State Hull finally stated in a dispatch to Madrid that he intended to inform
the Spanish Ambassador at Washington "that we consider that a satisfactory
solution of the Telephone Company problem is of fundamental importance
to all future relations between our two countries... ,"92 Thereafter, further
pressure was brought to bear upon the Spanish Government "combined with
an absolute refusal to discuss any needs of the Spanish Government particu-
larly including gasoline until a satisfactory solution is reached;"9 3 and at last
the American Ambassador was able to report that:
The growing conviction on the part of the Spanish authorities that we are
in earnest in our refusal to permit the telephone company case to be used
as a bargaining point coupled with our determination not to consider or dis-
cuss any Spanish needs until American rights and interests are recognized
has had its expected result.94
A settlement was thus eventually reached.
Another instance of economic sanctions being applied occurred in the
course of the prolonged diplomatic correspondence between the United States
and Ecuador relating to the Guayaquil and Quito Railway Company, which,
with various issues relevant from time to time, lasted for nearly thirty years. 95
90 Secretary of State Lansing, in a dispatch to the Minister at Bogotd on August 21,
1919, referring to the nationalization by Mexico of petroleum deposits in the preceding
years, termed the diplomatic dispute with Mexico "one of the most serious international
questions that ever confronted this Government... ." FOR. REL. 1919, I, 773.
91 FoR. REL. 1932, 11, 560-81, 1933, II, 698-703, 1939, IT, 820--56, 1940, II, 855-97.
92 FOR. REL. 1940, 11, 872.
93 Id. at 895.
94 Id. at 896.
95 FoR. REL. 1907, I, 385-91, 1908, 273-77, 1908, 277-79, 1912, 412-22, 1913, 473-504,
1914, 274-80, 1915, 340-73, 1916, 260-69, 1917, 730-47, 1918, 401-27, 1919, II, 171-200,
1920, 11, 191-206, 1921, 1, 881-95, 1923, , 926-40, 1924, I, 692-701, and 1936, V, 536-57.
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In 1918, diplomatic pressure was applied to the Ecuadorean Government in
order to elicit payment of outstanding interest on bonds issued for the financ-
ing of the railway. In order to enforce this claim, the United States considered
curtailing all imports from Ecuador of cacao. The Acting Secretary of State
in a cable to the American Minister at Quito summarized the substance of the
threatened sanction in no uncertain terms:
The Secretary of State requested the Ecuadoran Minister to call on him
this morning, and informed him, with reference to a note written by the
Minister inquiring whether the importations of cacao into the United States
from Ecuador were going to be restricted, that the War Trade Board pro-
poses to restrict very considerably, and possibly entirely, tht importations of
cacao into the United States from Ecuador, in order to save tonnage for
important war purposes. The Secretary of State further informed the Ecua-
doran Minister that the State Department would be in a much stronger
position to influence the War Trade Board to lessen the restrictions placed
on the importation of cacao from Ecuador if the Ecuadoran Government
would resume at once its daily payments of a 365th part of yearly payment
of the interest of the Guayaquil & Quito Railroad bonds and would deposit
50 per cent of the export duty on all.cacao exported as part payment of the
amount which Ecuador now owes as interest on these bonds, the American
Consul in Guayaquil to be informed officially by the Government of Ecua-
dor of the deposit made before issuance of license for each shipment of
cacao.
96
A recent illustration of sanctions is the still unresolved dispute between
the United States and the Castro Government of Cuba, largely relating to
confiscation of American investments. In 1960, after considerable diplomatic
correspondence and much hesitation, the United States decided to place
an embargo upon all exports to Cuba, excepting only non-subsidized food-
stuffs, machines and medical supplies. The reasons cited were that:
Accompanying its words with actions, the Government of Cuba has
instituted a series of arbitrary, illegal and discriminatory economic meas-
ures, which have injured thousands of American citizens and have drasti-
cally altered the hitherto mutually beneficial pattern of trade between the
United States and Cuba.97
96 FOR. REL. 1918, 411. The action was successful, as reported id. at 427.
97 Announcement by the State Department of October 20, 1960, quoted from N.Y.
Times, Oct. 20, 1960, p. 2 (int'l ed.). The various measures on the part of the Cuban Govern-
ment which lay at the basis of the complaint of the United States were summarized under
five points. They were (1) the imposition of taxes and restrictions upon certain United States
products; (2) surcharges and restrictions on foreign exchange; (3) requests that American
exporters ship on a 90-day open account, refusal to grant rediscount facilities to American-
owned financial institutions as well as threats of intervention against American firms
unless they continue to ship in raw materials in a normal manner despite the fact that dollars
had not been released to pay for earlier shipments of raw materials or for the remittance
of normal earnings; (4) discrimination against the United States in the administration of
Cuban trade regulations, etc.; and (5) seizure of private American investments and proper-
ties.
In retaliation against the export embargo, the Government of Cuba, on October 25,
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A contradictory feature of United States policy is that sometimes a principle
seems to have emerged to the effect that the United States does not desire
to connect the discussion and solution of one outstanding question between
the United States and a foreign country respecting, e.g., loan negotiations
and import quotas, with the settlement of a dispute concerning a government
action infringing upon American private investment. Thus, the United States
has at times refrained from linking issues of foreign policy which are inherently
separable, and has been reluctant to use the possibilities of applying pressure
which one matter has offered in order to obtain a satisfactory solution of
another matter.
Although attempts on the part of the United States to join separable issues
in diplomatic correspondence have occasionally been resisted, the Govern-
ment's formal justification under international law for such action has
rarely if ever been questioned. When differences of opinion have developed
in regard to this issue, they have rather centered on the political feasibility
of proposed actions than on their legality.9 8
4. Protests, Representations and Good Offices. The principal means of
exercising diplomatic support in relation to private investment is the lodging
of protests and representations. So far, attention has been focused on the
force which might ultimately be put behind the words in diplomatic corre-
spondence, the most extreme form being war; the other sanctions briefly
referred to, while less drastic, may yet in certain circumstances be serious
1960, nationalized 166 enterprises owned by United States companies or United States citi-
zens, which action is said to have "virtually eliminated major investments of United States
citizens in Cuba." N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1960 (int'l ed.).
93 A reference may be made to an instance where the problem became of crucial signifi-
cance, viz. in connection with the ratification by the United States Senate of a treaty entered
into with Colombia in 1914 providing for the settlement of damages claimed by Colombia
in connection with the secession of Panama. (Diplomatic correspondence on this question
before 1914 is printed in FOR. REL. 1909, 223-33, 1910, 361-408, 1911, 88, 1913, 284-329,
1914, 146-69 and subsequent correspondence in FOR. REL. 1915, 259-63, 1916, 211-16,
1917, 293-300, 1919, I, 724-25, 1919, I, 763-95, 1920, I, 823-27, 1921, I, 638-45, and 1922,
1, 974-79). The treaty was not ratified for many years, and when it was at last reported to
the Senate for ratification, it was recommitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations upon
the initiative of Senator Lodge with the request that the State Department seek to insert
into the text additional provisions aimed at securing guarantees on the part of the Colombian
Government for American investments that were threatened by new Colombian petroleum
legislation. After this request had been made public in Colombia, the American Minister
at BogotA reported that:
"The surprise and disappointment occasioned by our action in merging the treaty ques-
tion with that of the pending petroleum legislation is all too apparent among Colombians
of all classes, my South American colleagues and American representatives of oil and other
interests here. The press of Bogota is practically unanimous in condemning what is termed
the imperialistic and coercive policy of the great northern Republic and I have had warning
that violent demonstrations may result." FOR. REL. 1919, I, 740.
The issue was, however, never as such brought up to the level of an explicit diplomatic
exchange of views, as eventually the Colombian Government made what was considered
to be satisfactory amendments in her petroleum legislation.
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enough economically or otherwise. These topics will to some remain the most
essential aspect of the diplomatic activities of major powers.
In a legal study of diplomatic practice, however, the greatest interest does
not necessarily attach to analyses of the degree of force or power which has
actually been used or intimated. Indeed, it is submitted that the fact that the
United States has never in this area resorted to war, and has only rarely backed
up its words by sanctions, is of relatively minor interest. This is due not only
to the importance as such of mere protests or representations-which if
made by a nation like the United States often carry immense weight even in
the absence of specific threats of coercive action or its implementation. It is
also and especially because the primarily relevant problem is the delimitation
and classification of cases where protests are or have been deemed legitimate
and justified, and cases where this has not been so in the view of the United
States and of the nations vis-A-vis whom interpositions have been directed,
for a careful study of published documents in this respect serves to illumine
what is international law on the subjects under review.
In this regard, it may sometimes be impossible to state more than that the
United States has unilaterally and without success maintained that internation-
al law stipulates certain rules which allegedly have been infringed in the rele-
vant case. In other instances, settlements effected, agreements reached, or the
absence of legal exceptions taken by the foreign government concerned may
indicate that at least the two governments involved have agreed upon a
proposition of international law and/or its bearing upon the facts of a specific
case. In form, the purport of such legal propositions will always be either
the allowance or the denial of a government's plea that it possesses the right
to present a claim and to obtain due satisfaction for its demands.
Clearly, then, the material lends itself readily to analysis, exposition and
treatment using basically the same methods that have traditionally been ap-
plied to municipal or international case law, due consideration being given
to the peculiar qualities inherent in the nature of diplomatic correspondence
and to the fact that foreign policy-making in claims matters in some respects
differs from the judicial process.
Against the background of these considerations, it will be appreciated that
a detailed description and analysis of the individual qualities and intensity of
protests and representations which have been made will be of little benefit.
For it is hardly surprising to find that sometimes interpositions have been
strong and forceful whereas at other times they have been mild in both tone
and substance. This feature will naturally be of considerable practical im-
portance in each case to those directly involved, but in a legal study such as
the present, it will have only incidental relevance since, it must be repeated,
the basic questions always remain whether or not the United States has been
entitled to, or actually has lodged a protest or made representations in a given
set of factual circumstaaces, how such interpositions have been construed and
what results they have produced.
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When the United States Government has not for legal or other reasons
desired to protest or to make formal representations, or has been reluctant
for political or other motives to become too directly engaged and committed,
the State Department has resorted to what is termed "[informal] good offices."
Moore quotes an early instruction from Secretary of State Fish, in 1876,
where good offices were defined as meaning that the diplomatic agent shall
"investigate the subject, and if [he] shall find the facts to be as represented,
[he] will seek an interview with the minister for foreign affairs and request
such explanations as it may be in [the minister's] power to afford."99
In the diplomatic correspondence under review, the concept of good offices
abounds.100 However, it appears to have been used rather loosely, as a
surprising number of actions taken by the State Department and by diplomatic
agents abroad have in reality been no different from those that would in
ordinary circumstances be termed formal protests or representations.
The distinction has not merely a terminological interest; indeed, it is sub-
mitted that the concept has often been used, consciously or unconsciously,
as a convenient lever to modify the consequences of a too narrow theoretical
conception of the legal right of the United States to lodge protests in certain
circumstances where sense and reason and the necessities of reality have
been felt to demand a more direct and forceful involvement on the part of
the United States. And a misunderstanding of the term "good offices" and
its application in practice-sometimes coupled with a failure to appreciate
the impact and effect of diplomacy in cases where actions have not obtained
the form of legal claims or have not been labeled formal protests-is indeed
one of the main reasons which underlies the largely incorrect contention that
while the United States willingly lends diplomatic support to Americans
whose investments suffer from interference by a foreign government, this
will not be done when investments have been established on the basis of con-
tracts with foreign governments and such contracts are breached or not ful-
filled by the State. Thus, Hackworth states that:
Generally speaking the Department of State does not intervene in cases
involving breaches of contract between a foreign state and a national of the
United States in the absence of a showing of a denial of justice. However,
it may use its informal good offices in appropriate cases in an effort to bring
99 6 MooRE, A DIGST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 710-11 (1906). See also BORCHARD, THE
DniLo,qrxc PROTECnON OF CITZENS ABROAD 288 (1915).
100 A statement by the American Minister at Caracas in 1921 is indicative of what good
offices has meant in practice to some diplomatic representatives of the United States:
"During the six years that have intervened [since receipt of an instruction dated September
10, 1915 in which the State Department, considering a recently enacted law concerning the
rights of foreigners, reserved the right of the United States to exercise diplomatic protection
even before exhaustion of local remedies] it hasproved to be the rule rather than the exception
for American citizens and the representatives of American development, financial and com-
mercial companies and religious organizations to adjust their differences with the Govern-
ment of Venezuela through the good offices of the Legation," FoR. REL. 1921, 11, 941.
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about an adjustment ofdifferences. The practice of declining to intervene for-
mally prior to a showing of denial of justice is based on the proposition
that the Government of the United States is not a collection agency and
cannot assume the role of endeavoring to enforce contractual undertakings
freely entered into by its nationals with foreign states.101
This doctrine will shortly be discussed extensively. It will suffice to add here
only a few brief notes which support the submission that good offices may
indeed mean something substantially more than mere investigation and re-
quests for clarification of facts.
In 1937, the Bolivian Government, by executive resolution, cancelled
a concession held by the Standard Oil Company of Bolivia, a subsidiary
of the Standard Oil Company (N.J.), and confiscated its properties. The
concession contained a Calvo clause, and also a clause to the effect that the
Government might declare its abrogation or administrative annulment if the
concessionaire were to defraud government interests, which was alleged to
have been the case. These facts as well as subsequent developments compli-
cated the legal situation, particularly because the requirement of exhaustion
of local remedies was not fulfilled. It i's perhaps for this reason that the rubrics
in the Foreign Relations as well as official references speak of "informal
assistance" given to the Standard Oil Company (N.J.).
The diplomatic support extended by the State Department started with a
personal message from Secretary of State Hull to the Bolivian Foreign
Minister which only upon request was to be delivered in written form and
which was said:
* not to be construed as an official communication from one government to
another, but solely as an expression of my personal concern by reason of
the existence of a situation which may prejudice the steady growth of that
confidence on the part of all the peoples of the American republics one
towards the other, to the value of which I know Dr. Finot [the Bolivian
Foreign Minister], like myself, attaches the greatest importance.
The request submitted left no doubt of the wishes of the Secretary of State:
I expressly refrain from dealing at this time with any questions of fact or
law, but I do very earnesly desire to urge upon Dr. Finot the expression
of my sincere hope that steps may be taken by the Bolivian Government
at an early opportunity to make it clear that that Government has every
intention of offering just and equitable compensation for the properties
owned by nationals of the United States which may have been seized by
the Bolivian authorities, or, failing an agreement between these nationals
of the United States and the Government of Bolivia upon the form and
amount of such compensation, that it will agree upon some method of
adjudication of the rights and equities inherent.102
101 5 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 611 (1943). (Emphasis added.)
See further citations in 2 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAw § 303, n.1 (1945).
102 FoR. REL. 1937, V, 285. The American Minister at La Paz reported "that the
message made a definite impression on Dr. Finot was obvious from the fact that at the
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A new phase began when the Bolivian Government, on October 22,
1937, issued a decree prescribing that litigation arising from government
resolutions or administrative acts affecting contracts or concessions with the
State must be submitted to the Supreme Court within ninety days of adminis-
trative acts. On receiving news of the decree, Secretary of State Hull cabled
that "the Department is of the opinion that there is no action it can appropri-
ately take with respect to the decree of October 22,"103 and that subsequent
action would depend upon the outcome of the litigation. It is significant to
note, however, that the Department's attitude was quickly reversed after
a meeting with representatives of the Standard Oil Company (N.J.).104
A fortnight later, Mr. Hull instructed the American Minister to see the
Bolivian Minister for Foreign Affairs in order to "express to him the continu-
ing interest of your Government in the Standard Oil Company case and repeat
the hope of your Government that a solution satisfactory both to the Bolivian
Government and to the Company may be reached through direct negotiations
between the two parties conducted in a friendly spirit";105 furthermore,
the Minister was urged to seek to obtain an extension of the time limit for
submission of the case to the Supreme Court "to such reasonable period
as may be deemed necessary by the company's counsel."106
While the case was still pending before the Court, in the beginning of 1939,
Secretary of State Hull again instructed the Minister at La Paz that:
, It would, of course, be desirable if a friendly compromise settlement
of all questions now at issue could be reached without awaiting a decision
by the Court. It is not clear from your telegrams whether the Government
is disposed to bring about such a settlement. If in your judgment it is so
disposed, you may in an appropriate manner indicate to the Government
that the Department would be glad to see such a settlement made.107
In 1939, the Department of State also assisted in preparing draft arbitration
agreements, but the accounts of the matter given in Foreign Relations are in-
conclusive, and material documenting the ultimate outcome of the case has
not yet beeen published.108
beginning of his conversation his comments were much more guarded and temperate than
heretofore." Id. at 286.
103 Id. at 303.
104 See on this meeting the letter from Under Secretary of State Welles to Mr. Armstrong.
Id. at 304.
105 Id. at 303.
106 Ibid
107 FOR. REL. 1939, V, 325.
108 Documents on the case appear in FOR. REL. 1937, V, 275-311, 1938, V, 321-29 and
1939, V, 322-47.
The facts of the Bolivian expropriation through the decision of the Bolivian Supreme
Court have been dealt with in a booklet entitled CoNSCAiom A IsroRY OF THE OIL
INDUSTRY IN BOLIVIA, published privately in 1939. The writer is informed that as a result
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Another illustration of the realities often found behind diplomatic inter-
positions ostensibly restricted to the extension of good offices may be drawn
from the correspondence with Paraguay. In 1918, a concession granted
by the Government of Paraguay to the Construction and Engineering Finance
Company of New York was terminated by the Government for the reason
that works had not begun as stipulated in the agreement; the Company main-
tained that by reason of force majeure, as defined in the contract, it had not
been in a position to fully comply with its obligations. In a note presented by
the Acting Secretary of State to the Minister of Paragua X it was stated that:
the Government of the United States has examined the law and other docu-
ments presented in the case, and desires to present for your kind considera-
tion its feeling in respect to the matter .... Considering further the
friendly relations existing between the two Governments which we repre-
sent, I venture to suggest for Your Government's consideration, whether
it should not in equity and justice, and in the interest of all parties con-
cerned, interpret Article III of the law so as to allow an extension of the
period within which the works contemplated by it were to be completed.109
A few lines later, the Acting Secretary of State summed up by saying that
"I desire, therefore, to propose, informally by way of good offices, on behalf
of the company, that the President. . . ."1o A study of the further documents
in this matter reveals that the American Minister at Ascunsi6n was instructed
to "present the matter" to the Paraguayan Government,"' that upon further
examination, circumstances "confirmed [the] earlier conclusion [of the United
States Government] as to the innate justice of [its] request... .,,112 and in
the same communication from the Secretary of State to the Paraguayan
Minister, the latter was asked to advise promptly "whether the President of
Paraguay cannot possibly, upon further consideration, find some means of
complying with the request contained in [the original note referred to initially
of subsequent negotiations, a settlement was eventually agreed upon which purported to
constitute full compensation for the seizure but which was in fact quite inadequate, its
function primarily being to preserve the principle of compensation. It appears that the Stand-
ard Oil Company (N.J.) has consistently taken the view that in cases where its properties
have been subject to confiscatory measures abroad, the United States should seek to preserve
diplomatically and in settlement agreements the principle of compensation. See on the
attitude of the Standard Oil Company (N.J.) the statements by Mr. Farish made to the
chief of the Division of the American Republics, Mr. Duggan, in the memorandum of
conversation of May 31, 1938. FOR. REL. 1938, V, 752. Mr. Farish said in relation to the
issue under discussion, viz., the question of compensation for oil properties in Mexico that:
"If the company accepts some arrangement which in effect is based upon some compro-
mise of the principles of international law, the company then considers that it is lost since
a precedent will have been established. Other countries will follow suit and the company
will not be able in these cases to stand on the ground that if its properties are expropriated
they should be paid for at the time of taking in cash." Id. at 754.
109 FOR. REL. 1920, III, 329. 111 Id. at 331.
110 Id. at 329-30. (Emphasis added.) 112 Id. at 337.
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above] .... "113 A few days later, a formal note was sent by the Minister at
Ascunsi6n in which the request was made even more precise. 114 Eventually,
the United States demanded that, if no agreement could be reached between
the Government of Paraguay and the Company, "the entire case should
be submitted to arbitration under the arbitration clause of the concession." 1 5
The ultimate outcome of the case appears to have been a compromise agree-
ment reached between the two parties to the concession.116
Numerous other instances could be cited for the proposition that the
extension of "good offices" in disputes concerning private American foreign
investment has often constituted what-at least at the receiving end-must
have been understood as relatively forceful exercise of diplomatic protec-
tion.117 A government which is requested by the Government of the United
States in the clearest of terms to adopt or refrain from adopting measures
concerning private investments will rarely fail to view such a matter seriously,
irrespectivc of whether the American diplomatic communication is said to
constitute merely the exercise of good offices. It would be unrealistic, to say
the least, to consider, for this purely formal reason, the extensive case law
which has been created by the State Department in the course of this century
as of minor interest. It would be more appropriate to recognize this same case
law as the policy and practice of the United States Government and, conse-
quently, to perceive how vigorous, how flexible, and how responsive to
practical needs and to equity and justice the State Department has been,
and t6us to see the wide permissive limits of international law as it is handled
113 Id. at 338.
114 
"Because of all the foregoing I am further instructed to bring this whole matter to the
attention of His Excellency the President of Paraguay, through the intermediary of Your
Excellency, with a view to securing an annulment of the forfeiture of this concession, if
any such forfeiture has been decreed, that the franchise be revivified, and that the conces-
sionaire be now allowed a reasonably sufficient length of time to build the port." Id. at 340.
115 Id. at 342.
116 The documentation on the case is found in FoR. REL. 1920, MI, 323-43, 1921, 11,
623-27; cf. 1927, 111, 521-22.
117 See, e.g., the diplomatic correspondence relating to the Guayaquil and Quito Railway
Company, to which references have been given note 95 supra, passim and particularly that
exchanged in the years 1917, 1918 and 1919; the correspondence with Cuba relating to
the controversy between Compafiia de los Puertos de Cuba and the Government of Cuba,
FOR. REL. 1917,431-56; the protracted dispute with China pertaining to a concession held
by The Federal Telegraph Company set out in FOR. REL. 1921, I, 404-56, 1922, I, 844-60,
1923, 1, 783-826, 1924, I, 570-80, 1925, I, 890-935, 1926, I, 1040-92, 1927, 11, 472-82,
1928, H, 555-69, 1929, II, 829-33 and 1930, II, 626-27; the support given by the United
States to American holders of Portuguese Tobacco Monopoly bonds referred to in FOR.
REL 1926, IT, 880-97, particularly 885-87; the good offices extended by the Department of
State for securing suspension of lighterage charges on lighters owned by Grace & Company
in a Colombian port, FoR. REL. 1930, II, 641-48; the good offices of the Department of
State in resolving certain differences between the Colombian Government and American
bankers, FO. REL. 1931, 1, 28-40; and various instances cited in the section below which
is devoted to diplomatic support in disputes concerning contracts and concessions granted
by foreign governments to American nationals.
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from day to day in actual practice. For this diplomacy is shown often to
have been one step ahead of the international law enunciated in the judicial
process, and will likely as such eventually transform that law for the very
reason that customary international law is indeed, in the ultimate analysis,
but an abstract of the practice of States.
C. Formal Grounds of Interposition
In United States practice, diplomatic interposition will lie against those
acts of a foreign government which unreasonably infringe upon or interfere
with private American investment, in principle irrespective,of how such effect
is caused and irrespective also of whether actual loss has been occasioned.
Within the scope of a law review article, it is of course impossible to examine
the entire field of state responsibility- insofar as it has a bearing upon the pro-
tection of private investment, and no comprehensive treatment can therefore
be presented here of the numerous instances of diplomatic interposition
which may be grouped under such doctrinal headings as the minimum stand-
ard, denial of justice, or abuse of rights. Attention must instead be focused
on questions where a diversity of opinion has developed among legal writers
and on a few points where the practice of the United States is either relatively
unknown or else has been misinterpreted. The following survey must for these
reasons not be regarded as comprehensive; only a few selected problems will
receive attention, and the selection has not necessarily been made with a view
to the economic importance or the statistical frequency of actions of a par-
ticular kind.
1. Breach or Non-fulfilment by States of Concession Agreements and Other
Contractual Undertakings.
a. The Doctrine as Defined by Publicists. The opinion is widespread
that the Government of the United States will be less inclined to extend its
diplomatic support in disputes concerning the fulfilment of concessions or
contracts granted to American nationals by foreign governments than in
cases of interference with the property interests of American nationals.
In separating this question for examination, it is well to bear in mind Dr.
Mann's clear delimitation of the problem, which will be adhered to in the
following:
This, then, is the peculiar problem of state responsibility in relation to state
contracts: Is an act of sovereignty, which in regard to all other contracts
is innocent, capable of attracting the international liability of the state in
so far as it affects contracts made by the state?118
The theory supposedly adhered to in United States diplomatic practice
has been succinctly stated by Charles Cheney Hyde as follows:
Ever since the days of Madison the United States has been reluctant to
interpose in behalf of a citizen seeking redress from a foreign State on
I's Mann, State Contracts and State Responsibility, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 572, 574 (1960).
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account of its disregard of the terms of a contract concluded with him. It
has frequently been declared that unless the conduct of the contracting State
was tortious, the citizen should be left to hi& own devices, save for the pos-
sible assistance derived from the good offices of his country lent for the pur-
pose of encouraging the foreign State to give careful attention in a domestic
sense to the equities of the case.119
Hyde proceeds by drawing a distinction to the effect that only breaches of
contract which in addition to violating the agreement also present tortious
aspects will justify diplomatic interposition. 120 This distinction has been best
elaborated by Dunn, who with almost deceptive simplicity says that "the
distinguishing feature is an interjection of governmental power to alter the
situation envisaged in the contract." 121
For Eagleton, the matter of interposition in disputes concerning concessions
and contracts reduces itself essentially to a requirement of exhaustion of local
remedies;122 however, the local remedies rule need not be confused with the
legal problems attaching to the substance of claims and thus will not receive
attention infra.
It is of considerable importance to ascertain whether the theory thus
propounded is a valid and true expression of United States practice for it
119 2 HYDE, I? RNAFIONAL LAW 988 (1945). Cf. 3 WmTaMAN, op. cit. supra note 70, at
1553 (1943).
120 HYDE, op. cit. supra note 119, at 990.
121 DUNN, THE PROTECTION OF NATIONALS 167-(1932). Dunn's thesis is elucidated in the
following manner:
"So long as the state remains within its character as a contracting party and does not
take advantage of its superior governmental power to escape its obligations, then the private
contractor is usually left to sustain whatever losses may accrue from the contract. But when
it steps out of that character and takes action that a private contractor could not take, in
order to escape its obligations under the contract, then it upsets the contractual basis and
pursues a course of action that is quite incompatible with normal business relations; for
example, if it declares the contract void by its own decision, or seizes property belonging
to the other party to the contract, or declines to submit to suit thereunder, or seeks to alter
the terms of the contract without the consent of the other party." Id. at 165--66.
It may be remarked in passing that the rationale stated by Dunn, i.e., that the use of
governmental power "alters the status of the government as a credit risk," (Id. at 168)
hardly is convincing. While it is always impossible to foresee future events with certainty,
it does not appear substantially more difficult to calculate the risk of actions based on
sovereign power than others; and in any project of foreign investment, the political risks
are indeed assessed by investors at least as carefully as commercial risks.
12 2 EAGLETON, THE REsPoNSIBLITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 167 (1928):
"The true test in these, as in all other cases in which the state responds for an injury
done to an individual, is the provision which it makes for local redress. It is eminently
desirable that states should be given the opportunity to repair, in their own courts, the dam-
ages caused by their actions; and it is even more desirable that states should offer redress
against themselves, through judicial process, in such cases. The chief cause for diplomatic
interposition in cases of breach of contract is the fact that the state does not permit judicial
action against itself."
See also BORCHARD, op. cit. supra note 99, § 112 (1915). But cf. Clark, Book Review,
10 AM. J. INr'r L. 182-90 (1916).
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has never been intimated that any other nation regards its diplomacy as fet-
tered by a similar doctrine. 123
Furthermore, the very fact that the theory has received so much publicity
has tended to increase its appearance of being indicative of the practice of
States generally, and thus of the status of contracts and concessions under
international law. This is why it is necessary to analyze in some detail a
number of interpositions made by the United States in protection of contracts
and concessions held by American nationals.
b. The Crichfield Case. The Crichfield24 case marks the twentieth century
starting point for United States policy in relation to diplomatic protection
of contractual rights granted to American nationals by foreign governments.
In 1901, Crichfield, acting as the agent of a syndicate composed of American
citizens and afterwards incorporated in New Jersey under the style of The
United States and Venezuela Company, acquired a mineral concession in
Venezuela by assignment and later was granted by the Government of Vene-
zuela a concession for the building and operation of a railway. The railway
contract contained a clause which, with certain minor exceptions, exempted
the grantee from all national taxes or contributions. In reliance upon the
123 Dr. Mann, after establishing, on the basis of the argument presented by the Swiss
and French Governments in the Losinger case what he calls the "Swiss-French doctrine"
of international law to the effect that a mere breach by a government of a contract with
a foreign national is an international wrong, makes the surprising statement that "no other
state seems to have adopted the Swiss-French doctrine." Mann, supra note 118, at 578.
He thereafter states, .citing secondary sources, that "the practice of the United States
of America has, for more than a century and a half, been clearly opposed to it." Ibid.
It is borne out in the subsequent parts of Dr. Mann's study where these statements appear
that the argument which has now been quoted is the cornerstone in the largely negative
answer which he gives to the query to which he addresses himself, quoted in the text at note
118 supra.
124 The Crichfield (or United States and Venezuela Company) case was one of five cases
which were subject to protracted diplomatic correspondence in the beginning of this cen-
tury, the other cases being the Jaurett claim; the claim of the Manoa Co. (Ltd.), Orinoco
Company (Ltd.), and Orinoco Corporation; the claim of the Orinoco Steamship Compainy;
and the claim of the New York and Bermudez Company. The correspondence has been
published by the United States in FOR. REL. 1905, 919-1030, 1907, II, 1093-96, 1908,
774-830, 1909, 609-30, 1910, 868; and by Venezuela in LinRo AMARELLO (Venezuela)
1909, 103-16, 142-46, 1910, 311-13, 317-23, 1917, II, 501-09. See further Correspondence
Relating to Wrongs Done to American Citizens by the Government of Venezuela, S. Doc.
No. 413, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. (1908); La New York and Bermudez Company Alegato de
sus Derechos contra una flegal Resolucidn Ejecutiva (1899); the pamphlet DAs REcHT
UND DIE GERECHTIGKEIT VENEZUELAS UND DIE NEw YoRK AND BERMUDEZ CoMPANY; a
statement by the Company entitled In the Matter of the Suit Brought against the New York
and Bermudez Company by the Venezuelan Government to Recover Damages for Aiding
in the Matos Revolution; another statement by the Company entitled The Violent and
Illegal Seizure of Bermudez Lake by the Venezuelan Government (Aug. 22, 1904); Annual
Report to the Stockholders of the General Asphalt Company (1906); US Senate: Letter
of the Company to the Committee on Foreign Relations (April 22, 1908); Letter of John
W. Foster to Hon. S. M. Cullough, April 14, 1908; In the Matter of the New York and
Bermudez Company v. Venezuela, printed and distributed by the General Asphalt Company
(1908).
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contract, the concessionaire expended considerable amounts of money in
the fulfilment of his obligations. Later, the Venezuelan Government imposed
certain new taxes upon the company in contravention of the concession, and
a dispute ensued in which the concessionaire maintained that imposition
of the taxes was wrongful; the State Department was petitioned to call upon
the Government of Venezuela to live up to and perform all the covenants
and conditions on its part to be performed under the concession. The Vene-
zuelan Government argued in defense that the railway concession granted
by the President of Venezuela was not valid inasmuch as it had not been
approved by special act of the Venezuelan Goverment.
In examining the petition, the State Department prepared a comprehensive
memorandum of law which is written in a manner that suggests that the then
Secretary of State, Elihu Root, may have been its author.125 The memorandum
is no ordinary policy paper but has all the qualities of a considered judicial
opinion; in fact, the theory of "contract claims" has never been subjected
to so penetrating a study. Its contents will now be summarized.
First it should be noted that the Crichfield case, in the view of the State
Department, presented squarely the question of the admissibility of diplomatic
interposition in contract cases. Thus, it was stated that "it is apparent that
the claim... is based upon the breach of a concession"; 126 the contention
of the Government of Venezuela that the concession was invalid was dismissed
as "too flimsy to be worthy of notice."1 27 The conclusion was therefore
reached that "the concession is... to use a technical expression, valid and
subsisting."128 Likewise, it was maintained that "the breach of the terms of
the concession on the part of the Government of Venezuela is as clear as the
validity of the contract is unquestionable."1 29
The State Department, after establishing these facts, faced squarely the
problem arising from the circumstance that:
the claim in the present case arises entirely from a breach of contract not
associated with any tortious act-that it is a pure contract claim. And it is
objected that according to the principles of international law and the en-
lightened practice of civilized nations such a claim furnishes no ground for
international reclamations.130
In analyzing this problem, the memorandum acknowledged the fact "that
there is a very considerable body of practice which lends more or less
support to this view ... ."131 However, on principle, for reasons given, it
was believed "that in the abstract there is no particular reason why a nation
should intervene in order to protect its citizens who have suffered tortious
125 S. Doc. No. 413, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. 95-118 (1908).
126 Id. at 103. 129 Id. at 105. Cf. id. at 106.
127 Id. at 104. 13Id. ate107.
128 Id. at 105. 131 I-bid.
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injury at the hands of a foreign nation and refuse to take similar steps in
behalf of its citizens who have suffered from the repudiation of contractual
obligations .... ," and since "the precise method by which they have been
deprived of these rights, so long as it be illegal, would not seem to be material
as a matter of principle." 132 While it was admitted that the general practice
of the United States in the nineteenth century had been not to intervene in
contract cases except unofficially by way of good offices, it was significantly
added that:
There are not wanting, however, expressions on the part of the Depart-
ment of State which would seem to take a different view of the matter,
and to place the refusal of our Government to intervene in such cases
upon grounds of expediency rather than to explain it as based upon settled
principles of international law. 133
and it was stressed that "the adherence of the Department to this view has
not, however, been universal and without exception."1 34
Indeed, in considering the statement by Moore that the State Department
would see fit to extend diplomatic protection only in situations of confiscatory
breaches of contract, the memorandum noted that a number of the cases
discussed by Moore in the relevant section of International Arbitrations
"are cases of simple breach of contract in which, so far as the record shows,
there was no tortious element..." and "a number of these cases appear
to be cases growing out of a simple breach of contract, nonpayment for
supplies furnished, or services rendered."1 35
After emphasizing again that the case was one of a contract claim in which
the tortious element was lacking,136 and repeatedly stressing also that no
13z Id. at 108.
133 Id. at 109.
134 Id. at 109.
135 Id. at I11t.
It may be observed that in the following section of the memorandum, a parallel is drawn
between international law and municipal law in relation to the protection of contracts
in which the following highly interesting passage occurs:
"The recognition of the right of a nation to intervene in behalf ofone ofits citizens within
the territorial limits of another has followed the order which we found in the history of
private law. First, the right has been recognized in cases of crime against the person; second,
in the case of torts against the person or property; and third, in the case of breaches of
contract resulting in gross injustice, especially if these breaches have been of a confiscatory
nature amounting in fact to a tortious seizure of property. It seems, therefore, not unreason-
able to suppose that the future development of international law, as its past development,
in regard to the enforcement of contractual rights, will be along the lines of private law,
and that inasmuch as there seems to be no difference in principle between the enforcement
ofa right growing out of a contract and a right growing out ofa tort, and since in the history
of private law the enforcement of a right growing out of a tort has come first, to be followed
by the enforcement of contractual obligations, such should also be the course of public
law, and that the public law in the future, as the municipal law of the present, may properly
enforce without distinction rights arising out of the breach of contract and rights growing
out of the tortious seizure of property." Id. at 114.
136 Id. at 116.
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tortious seizure of property had taken place which would make it justified
to classify the act of the Venezuelan Government as a confiscatory breach
of contract, 137 the memorandum stated that Crichfield would not have
accepted the concession without its tax exemption clause. And after taking
note of the fact that it would be unnecessary to exhaust local remedies since
"the courts of Venezuela do not seem to be the handmaids ofjustice, but rather
the instruments of its prostitution,"138 the conclusion was reached that, "Un-
der these circumstances, it is recommended that the Department attempt
to secure an arbitration of this case before an impartial international tribunal
... "139
The reasons for extending diplomatic support to Crichfield could hardly
have been more explicit.
Subsequent diplomatic interpositions followed the arguments and recom-
mendation of the memorandum so closely that the instructions and dispatches
of the State Department need not be extensively quoted here. In this regard,
it may only be noted that Secretary of State Root carried on the corre-
spondence mainly by sending detailed memoranda to the American Minister
at Caracas, in which the arguments advanced in the State Department's
memorandum were used.140 As noted above,141 the differences which evolved
between the United States and Venezuela in regard to the Crichfield claim
and to other cases dealt with simultaneously were so profound that at one
stage the United States severed diplomatic relations with Venezuela. Eventual-
ly, however, an agreement was reached between the United States and Vene-
zuela on February 13, 1909, to the effect that certain of the claims should
be submitted to arbitration, including that of The United States and Venezuela
Company. 142 Six months later, however, the Crichfield claim was settled by
a special Protocol between the United States and Venezuela, signed on August
21, 1909. Pursuant to it, the Government of Venezuela took over the con-
cessions and properties of the company against payment of $475,000, to
be paid over a period of eight years. 143
137 Id. at 117.
138 Id. at 115.
139 Id. at 118.
140 See particularly Secretary of State Root's memoranda of February 28,1907, FoR. REL.
1908, 774-96, at 793-96, and of June 21, id. at 1907, 800-05, 804-05.
141 See text at note 89 supra.
142 FOR. REL. 1909, 617.
143 Id. at 624-25; LIBRo AMARmLo (Venezuela) 1910,-311-13, and on the final payment,
LIBRo AMMAULLO (Venezuela) 1917, 11, 501-09. It is not possible to examine in this context
the diplomatic correspondence concerning the other claims of the United States against
Venezuela which arose and were adjusted simultaneously with the Crichfieldclaim. However,
a close study of it evidences that the stand taken by the United States which has been exten-
sively described above was not unique. See the references supra note 124 and S. Doec. No.
413, 60th Cong., Ist Sess., Appendix 273-643 (1908), which contains some documents of
interest that have not been printed in Foreign Relations.
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c. Contract Claims in Twentieth Century Diplomatic Practice. The writer
has not found any case subsequent to the Crichfield claim in which the United
States has declined to interpose in support of rights of American nationals
derived from contracts and concessions granted by foreign governments,
except in circumstances where a refusal has been predicated upon the require-
ment of exhaustion of local remedies, and even such instances have been
rare since representations have often been made before claimant has had
recourse to courts or administrative procedures in the foreign country.
Prominent among cases where support has been given in order to enforce
fulfilment by foreign governments of their contractual obligations have been
situations where, absent the contract, the acts of the State complained of
would have been legitimate.144
With respect to the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies, it is sig-
nificant that seemingly the problems have never been discussed in legal litera-
ture that arise in disputes concerning concession agreements which contain
arbitration clauses and where the foreign government declares either that the
dispute is not arbitrable thereunder or else simply refuses to comply with
stipulations of the arbitration clause-145
In 1921, in a dispute between Costa Rica and the Costa Rican Oil Corpora-
144 This is not to say that instances are lacking where the tortious element has been pres-
ent. This aspect has been predominant particularly in certain instances where foreign govern-
ments have sought to cancel or abrogate concessions, but it should be noted that in many
of these cases, the foreign government has maintained that cancellation ought to result
from non-performance by the concessionaire of his obligations; termination has thus
often been expressly authorized in the text of the contracts, and the precise issue has been
one of interpretation of the contract. See, e.g., the protests of the Department of State
against the attempt by the Chinese Government to cancel the so-called Siems-Carey railway
contract, FoR. REL. 1920, I, 674-79, and the interesting correspondence concerning the
controversy between the National Railroad Company of Haiti and the Government of
Haiti, FoR. REL. 1915, 538-49, 1916, 368-85, and 1917, 813-33.
14S See, however, Schwebel, supra note 75, at 269; Report of the Committee on Nationaliza-
tion of Foreign Property of the International Law Association to the 48th Conference of the
International Law Association, New York meeting (1958).
The evident admissibility of immediate diplomatic interposition in such circumstances
may be the primary reason which prompts Dr. Garcia-Amador to perceive a principal
distinction between the status under international law of concessions which either contain
no arbitration clause or are governed by municipal law and those which provide for arbitra-
tion of a clearly international character. Cf. the following statement appearing in Dr.
Garcia-Amador's Fourth Report on International Responsibility:
"The mere fact that a State agrees with an alien private individual to have recourse to
an international mode of settlement automatically removes the contract, at least as regards
relations between the parties, from the jurisdiction of municipal law. Unlike the Caro
Clause which reaffirms the exclusive jurisdiction of the local authorities, agreements of this
type imply a 'renunciation' by the State of the jurisdiction of the local authorities. If an
arbitration clause of this type were governed by municipal law, it could be amended or even
rescinded by a subsequent unilateral act of the State, which would be inconsistent with the
essential purpose of stipulations of this type, whatever the purpose of the agreement or the
character of the contracting parties. Accordingly, as the obligation in question is undeniably
international in character, non-fulfilment of the arbitration clause would directly give rise
to the international responsibility of the State," U.N. Doc. No. AJCN. 41119,85-86 (1959).
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tion, the Government, in contravention of the arbitration clause in the con-
cession, demanded immediate reference of the dispute to a sole arbitrator.
Secretary of State Hughes then instructed the Charg6 in Costa Rica as follows:
If corporation desires that representations be made, request Foreign
Office to state what justification there is for demand that questions in dis-
pute with Costa Rican Oil Corporation be arbitrated otherwise than as pro-
vided in corporation's concession. Add that arbitrary cancellation conces-
sion would presumably result in filing of international claim to which
Department would necessarily give careful consideration.14 6
At a later stage, after the Department of State had had opportunity to
study the precise terms of the concession against the background of a dispute
centering upon its interpretation, a long instruction was sent to the Minister
in Costa Rica in which the Company's contractual rights were subjected to
a persuasive and detailed legal analysis and construction. The instruction
concluded with the following remarks:
In conclusion, you may express the hope that the Government of Costa
Rica will find means of bringing to an end in a just manner the vexatious
controversy which has been in progress between the Government and the
corporation; that the Government will accord the company the cooperation
contemplated by the concession contract in order that the corporation may
enjoy the benefits to which it is entitled under the concession, the validity
of which has not been questioned, and that its work may not be further
impeded and its enterprise wrecked and investment of several millions of
dollars lost, and in order also that the two Governments may be spared
the inconvenience which attends measures looking to the recovery of
indemnity for losses sustained as a result of unwarranted interference by the
authorities of one Government in the enjoyment of legal rights possessed
by the citizens of another.147
Another instance in which government interference with the contractual
rights of American nationals has elicited the support of the United States
Government occurred in 1932 when the Greek Government proposed to
modify a contract held by the Monks-Ulen & Company since 1928. Secre-
tary of State Stimson instructed the American Charg6 in Greece to "inform
the Greek Government that this Government expects that no action will be
taken in violation of the terms and spirit of the contract without the consent
of the American companies ...."148
The policy of the United States becomes even clearer in situations where
the restrictive doctrine of contract claims has been invoked in defense by
foreign nations against representations made on account of interference
with the contractual rights of American nationals. Thus, the Government of
146 FOR. REL. 1921, I, 669.
147 FOR. REL. 1922, 1, 1002.
148 FOR. REL. 1932, 11, 442.
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Ecuador once questioned the right of the United States to support in diploma-
cy the claims of the Guayaquil & Quito Railway Company. The ForeignMinis-
ter of Ecuador, in a communication of February 28, 1917 pointed out that
he did not find the attitude of the American Government in this matter in
harmony with the policy previously observed, as stated by Secretaries of
State Fish and Blaine in their well-known pronouncements in 1871 and 1881,
respectively.14 9
The attitude of Secretary of State Lansing was, however, distinctly different.
One of his instructions to the Minister at Quito read as follows:
Advise Foreign Office that its reply to your note of January 15 is wholly
unsatisfactory to Government of United States which finds ample warrant
for its diplomatic intervention in the needed protection for large American
interests threatened with destruction through failure of Government of
Ecuador to respect its contractual obligations, and in the whole record
of the dealings by that Government with these American interests.150
149 FoR. REL. 1917, 741-43.
Is0 Id. at 737.
Other noteworthy instances in which the United States has extended diplomatic support
aimed at securing fulfilment by foreign governments of contracts and concessions entered
into by them with American nationals include: the correspondence concerning the con-
cession of the National Bank of Haiti, FOR. REL. 1914, 334-82, 1915, 496-538, 1916, 338-68
and 1916, 385-88; the support lent to the Pacific Development Corporation in maintaining
its rights under a contract with the Chinese Government, FOR. REL. 1920, 1, 605-74, par-
ticularly at 631 ; the correspondence relating to the claim of the Mercantile Bank of the
Americas against Ecuador for the debt of the Cacao Growers Association, FoR. REL.
1924, I, 701-07, particularly the vigorous protest of Secretary of State Hughes, id. at
705-07, FOR. REL. 1925, II, 59-64; the assistance of the Department of State to the United
Fruit Company in Colombia concerning irrigation works, FOR. REL. 1928, 11, 635-37;
the activities of the Department of State in behalf of American interests in the Barco
petroleum concession vis-A-vis Colombia, FOR. REL. 1928, 11, 603-35, 1931, II, 18-28; the
protection of interests of American oil companies in Colombia, Fop.. REL. 1928,11, 588-603;
the protection of the contract rights of the Oriental Consolidated Mining Company vis-&-vis
acts of the Japanese Government, FOR. REL. 1934, 111, 820-26, 1935, I1, 1097-99; and
the protection extended to All-America Cables Inc. vis-A-vis Ecuador in relation to a claim
on the part of the Government for immediate payment of back taxes allegedly owed by
the company, FOR. REL. 1938, V, 554--60.
In some instances, even payment of ordinary and minor commercial debts has been
exerted by means of diplomatic pressure. See, e.g., the settlement of the claim of Hall, or
Weyman, FOR. REL. 1904, 392-93.
Reference may further be made to the assistance rendered by the Department of State
to the Federal Telegraph Company which in 1921 signed a contract with the Chinese
Government for the construction and operation of wireless stations in various Chinese
cities. The terms of this contract conflicted with grants previously given by the Chinese
Government in concessions concluded with Danish, British, and Japanese interests. The
United States maintained that the latter contracts were ultra vires since a treaty between the
United States and China of 1858 granted the United States most favored nation status;
although the protests to the concessionaires' governments were rejected, the United States
insisted on specific performance by China of her undertakings in the contract with the
American company. See FoR. REL. 1921, I, 404-56, 1922, I, 844-60, 1923, I, 783-826,
1924, I, 570-80, 1925, I, 890-935, 1926, I, 1040-092, 1927, II, 472-82, 1928, II, 555-69,
1929, 11 829-33, and 1930, II, 626-27.
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In order to avoid misunderstanding, it should be remarked that the
voluminous diplomatic correspondence between the United States and Mexi-
co,'51 which has attracted so much public attention, to a very limited extent
concerned contractual claims, particularly inasmuch as the petroleum con-
cessions held by American companies were rather to be viewed as property
interests than as rights based on contracts. 152 Even though some instruments
known as concessions in Mexican law did present more marked contractual
features, such as the concession held by the Compaiia Petrolera Maritima
S.A.,153 the diplomatic correspondence does not seem to have been directed
to enforcement of specific contract rights since requests based on such grounds
were merged with the over-riding aspect of confiscation of property rights
in general. Besides, interpositions based on interference by Mexican authorities
with concessions held by American nationals have to the writer's knowledge
only been made in cases which have involved a tortious aspect by constituting,
e.g., outright confiscation or arbitrary cancellation.
Lastly, it may be remarked that the space does not permit a discussion
of whether the attitwde of the United States had differed materially in relation
to protection of claims of American nationals based on bonds issued by
foreign governments. It may merely be suggested that the policies and practice
of the State Department underwent a substantial change in the wake of the
151 United States diplomacy aimed at protecting investments in Mexico may be divided
into two main phases, i.e., between 1914 and 1921 and between 1925 and 1940. The docu-
mentation is published in FOR. REL. 1914, 668-784, 1915, 870-1004, 1916, 708-87, 1917,
1038-78, 1918, 687-792, 1919, II, 591-632, 1920, in, 200-26, 1921, 11, 447-93, 1925, II,
512-54, 1926, II, 605-87, 1927, III, 169-228, 1928, il1, 193-208, 1935, IV, 764-70, 1937,
V, 644-78, 1938, V, 720-61, 1939, V, 667-719; the final settlement of the last phases of the
disputes is recorded in AGREEMENT WITH MEXICO ON EXPROPRIATION OF PETROLEUM PROP-
ERTIES. Nov. 19, 1941, E.A.S. No. 234; 9 DEPT. STATE BULL. 230 (1943), and Briggs,
The Settlement of Mexican Claims Act of 1942, 37 AM. J. INT'L L. 222-32 (1943), with cita-
tions and references.
152 It is illustrative to note in this connection the characterization presented by Mr. Wm.
Loeb, Jr. in a letter to the Secretary of State on October 19, 1915 relating to confiscatory
taxation measures employed by Mexican authorities:
"In conclusion, I beg leave to add that the matter here presented is in no way connected
with the much misunderstood subject of Mexican 'concessions.' Such concessions are granted
pursuant to law, and in the manner and under the rules prescribed by law (see law of
Nov. 10, 1908). Foreigners may have the benefit of them not otherwise than natives may.
They are not available to the mining industry except as they are available to every other
industry. They are in the nature of franchises, analogous to our grant of a charter of incor-
poration, or of a license to engage in a certain business, and are granted to encourage the
investment of capital in new enterprises and to aid in the development of new industries.
They run for a limited term of years, and the exemptions they allow from certain minor forms
of taxation are counter-balanced by the obligations they impose upon the concessionary,
in respect of the amount of capital invested, the character of the development, and the sub-
jection exacted to supervision by the state. Such mining concessions as this company and its
subsidiaries have held have long since expired by limitation." FOR. REL. 1915, 961.
153 The text is summarized in FoR. REL. 1916, 743.
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Great Depression, which eventually was manifested, inter alia, in the organiza-
tion of the Foreign Bondholders' Protective Council. 15 '
d. Informal Assurances and Promises. Perhaps the best indication of the
liberal policy and practice of the United States in relation to support of the
contractual rights of American nationals vis-&-vis foreign governments will
be found in cases where, stricto sensu, no explicit contracts or concessions have
even been signed but where large investments have .been made in reliance
upon promises and assurances of a foreign government of an informal
character.
Reference may be made here to the strong representations which were
made to France in 1933 when it was reported that the French Government
considered instituting a petroleum monopoly and as a first step to this end
contemplated curtailing allocated import quotas for oil. At the time when this
matter was brought to the attention of the State Department, there was "no
tangible move towards taking over [the] storage tanks, equipment and refining
facilities [of foreign or domestic oil companies in France]," but a Finance
Commission had:
avowed its purpose of creating an import monopoly and [was] studying
the practicability of a refining monopoly, an intention which, if carried out,
might destroy or greatly curtail the market for American oil and would
probably reduce the status of American companies operating in France
to that of mere middlemen. Furthermore, it would violate the system of
licenses upon which these companies have predicated their investments
in France.1 55
It was reported that the Commercial Councilor of the British Embassy
made official verbal representations to the French Foreign Office, stating that:
since British oil interests had made large investments in France on 20-year
contracts guaranteed by existing legislation the establishment of a mo-
nopoly would necessarily call for strong formal protests on the part of his
Government and indemnification to cover investments made.156
Secretary of State Hull instructed the Charg6 in France to take up the mat-
ter orally but nevertheless as under instructions from his Government with
the appropriate French authorities. He was recommended "an approach
along the same lines as those taken by the British."157
154 FOR. REL. 1933, 1, 934-39, 1936, V, 149-58.
155 FOR. REL. 1933. II, 168-76, at 170.
136 Id at 172.
157 Id. at 173. The following passage in the dispatch illustrates the reliance placed by
Secretary of State Hull upon the licenses issued by the French Government:
"In 1919, when a monopoly was first proposed following the war, you will find from your
files that the Embassy made representations to the French Government and that the French
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Another similar instance may be cited. In 1934, the assistance of the State
Department was requested by the Vacuum Oil Company in an effort to
secure from the Austrian Government an increased import quota for crude
oil. It appears that the various foreign oil companies operating in Austria
had for some years obtained import quota allocations corresponding to their
refining capacity. In 1933, the Vacuum Oil Company considerably increased
its refining capacity and subsequently requested a corresponding increase in
its import quota. The American Minister in Austria examined the claim of the
Vacuum Oil Company and arrived at the conclusion, concurred in by the
Department of State, that assistance could not appropriately be given to the
company in order to secure a higher import quota for 1934, since he had been
informed by the Austrian Ministry of Finance that the investments had been
made by the company without assurances from the Government of a larger
quota. Therefore, the American Minister was of the opinion that:
If the Government chooses to deny that assurances were given to the
Vacuum Oil Company that its quota would be increased if its capacity were
augmented, or if it did not make such promise, there can be no basis for
representation on the grounds of discrimination .... Discrimination does
not exist unless it can be shown a definite promise was made by a responsible
official of the Austrian Government.158
An e contrario interpretation of the position taken by the United States
Government in this matter suggests indeed that even a very slight contractual
element entering into the relationship between an American investor and
a foreign government justifies diplomatic interposition aimed at securing the
fulfilment by the latter of its obligations. This is another illustration of the
thesis that the United States has not regarded itself as severely bound by
formal criteria in offering diplomatic protection. The State Department has
pursued a flexible and realistic course in situations where, from a reasonable
point of view, American investments may be said to suffer from unwarranted
government replied to the effect that the question of establishing an oil monopoly was one
of internal policy in which foreign governments may only find grounds to intervene if the
monopoly jeopardizes any rights acquired by their nationals or if the monopoly deliberately
favors exporters of certain nationalities to the prejudice of others. (See Embassy's telegram
1409, September 19, 1919). The American companies maintain that through their license au-
thorizations and by reason of the obligations which they have incurred thereunder, they have
acquired rights for the period of the licenses in question, namely, 20 years. Upon the basis of
these licenses they have gone into France with their capital and established import facilities
and refineries at a cost of approximately $50,000,000. If an import monopoly and/or a
refining monopoly were established by the French Government the rights acquired under
these licenses would be jeopardized." Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
158 FOR. REL. 1934, II, 61-70, at 69. (Emphasis added.)
Cf. in this context the representations in support of the Standard Oil Company of
Yugoslavia in respect to Yugoslav customs duties. FOR. REL. 1932, H, 606-17.
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interference by foreign governments but where the strict and often cumber-
some requirements of municipal law have not yet been fulfilted.159
2. Unreasonable Infringement of Economic Rights and Interests. In circum-
stances where breach by a State'of undertakings made in contracts with aliens
constitutes a breach of international law, such contracts mostly offer a clear
basis for diplomatic interposition inasmuch as the act of the State can be
judged to be in conformity or at variance with stipulated conditions.
In situations where governments have not undertaken any special obliga-
tions in regard to foreign investments, international responsibility will be
incurred only if general principles and rules of international law have been
infringed. As mentioned earlier, it is not possible to examine in this context
all the grounds of international law upon which the United States diplomatic
protection has rested. Perhaps it is true to say that most instances may be
classified with greater or lesser accuracy under headings such as confiscation,
discriminatio'n, and procedural denial of justice. It is possible, however, that
the United States practice may rather more adequately be said to have adhered
to the view that the responsibility of a foreign State becomes engaged whenever
there has been established an unreasonable infringement of economic rights
and interests held by American nationals, for although not admitting of pre-
cise demarcation, certain aspects in the material are not sufficiently accounted
for if the cases be grouped exclusively within traditional concepts.160
3. Timing of Diplomatic Interposition. While formal legal claims demanding,
for example, compensation on account of confiscation of alien-owned property
can hardly be permissible before concrete measures of taking have been
implemented, the situation is entirely different with regard to diplomatic
claims. Diplomatic interposition must then be regarded as comparable to
1S9 In a dispute concerning forfeiture of a railway held by an American national in
Honduras, Acting Secretary of State Wilson, in an argument directed against the contention
of the Government of Honduras that the railway concession was invalid, made the significant
statement that:
"It seems quite evident that, totally irrespective of whether or not the formal concession
or lease granted to Mr. Valentine was valid and constitutional, the Honduran Government
could not now expect successfully to maintain that by this governmental action the Govern-
ment had not assumed such a special relation to Mr. Valentine in connection with his pos-
session and operation of the railroad as would entail reciprocal rights, duties and obliga-
tions, which would have to be adjusted." FOR. REL. 1913, 594-607, at 601.
160 Consider for instance the representations to the Brazilian Government regarding pro-
posed insurance legislation affecting the rights of American companies, FOR. REL. 1937, V,
360-71; the representations in behalf of Standard Oil Company (N.Y.) in Bulgaria with
respect to government action fixing the price of kerosene, FoR. REL. 1931, 1, 886-91 ; the rep-
resentations on behalf of Socony Vacuum Oil Company respecting Bulgarian monopoly leg-
islation to safeguard American investment in "Petrole," FOR. REL. 1934, II, 106-09; the
representations in behalf of the Chile Copper Company and the Andes Copper Mining
Company regarding effects of a proposed coal law on American interests, FOR. REL. 1927,
I, 537-41, and the representations in the same year to the Chilean Government regarding
effects of proposed insurance legislation on American interests, id. at 541-49; and the rep-
resentations against the Chilean petroleum bill of May 17, 1932, FOR. REL. 1932, V, 505-11.
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such municipal legal relief actions as injunctions or cease and desist orders,
which to be fully effective must be taken promptly. In fact, in the area under
review, the overwhelming majority of interpositions have been made at a
time when foreign government action has not proceeded beyond the enactment
of a law which for its implementation has required further concrete administra-
tive or other measures, or even when legislation has merely been proposed,
recommended or suggested and has yet had to pass through sometimes
cumbersome legislative or parliamentary processes. It is submitted that in
fact the effectiveness and real value of diplomatic action often results from
this very circumstance that the objections and representations of a complaining
foreign government are made swiftly before any actual damage has been
occasioned and before it may be too late psychologically for respondent gov-
ernment to reconsider its position.
Nearly all interpositions made by the United States in this century in
protection of American investments evidence the thesis propounded above,
and it is therefore not necessary to document it in detail.16l
The right of the United States to intervene at so early a stage has hardly
ever been questioned by foreign States, which evidently have acquiesced in the
legitimate character of such action; differences of opinion have rather
centered upon the substance of the representations made. It is also clear that
interpositions by the State Department have often been successful in that after
protests have been made, legislative proposals have been abandoned, or the
foreign government has abstained from taking the measures which would
have unreasonably injured the economic interests of American nationals. 62
161 Merely by way of one typical illustration, the following diplomatic incident may be
referred to. On January 9, 1926 the American Minister in Roumania delivered a formal note
of protest to the Roumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs in which he stated that the draft
of a law then pending before the Chamber of Deputies would, if enacted, seriously prejudice
American interests. The Secretary of State cabled that:
"The Department approves your action in informing the Foreign Minister that the pro-
posed legislation regarding subsoil rights in embatic lands would, if enacted into law, seem-
ingly destroy vested subsoil rights lawfully acquired by American interests.
"You may supplement your representations with a statement that the Government
of the United States would view with concern any action by the Roumanian authorities
which would prejudice American interests in subsoil rights acquired in accordance with the
laws of Roumania and in good faith." FOR. REL. 1926, II, 903.
162 It is another matter that for reasons of convenience the State Department has some-
times desired to temporarily withhold representations before concrete measures have been
taken in compliance with proposed or enacted laws. See, e.g., the following passage occurring
in an instruction from the Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain of August
13, 1927:
"As there seems to be a certain possibility that the Spanish oil-monopoly scheme may
prove to be unworkable and may not actually be put into effect, it is the opinion of the
Department that any direct observations to the Spanish Government on the subject at the
present time would be premature and might be misconstrued and hence tend to increase
the determination of the Spanish Government to put the decree into full force," FOR. REL.
1927, III, 668.
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D. Remedies Sought
A few brief remarks should be made on the question of what remedies
the State Department has sought in diplomatic claims concerning private
American investment. No clear and settled rules are discernible in this
respect, and an examination of the material hardly yields more than an overall
impression that although there are exceptionally wide leeways for the formula-
tion and substance of requests made in diplomacy, it is difficult and perhaps
not even feasible to link the use of such requests with a general theory of
the legitimacy of remedies. The choice of remedies has closely depended on
the circumstances in each case, and the aim of the State Department has in-
variably been the flexible and reasonable one of seeking to prevent whatever
government actions that might be prevented, or if that is too late, to obtain
reparation or compensation such as has seemed appropriate and effective
in the circumstances at hand.
As will have appeared from the notes above on the subject of timing of
diplomatic interposition, the remedies demanded have most often been of
a negative character. The United States has in such situations called upon
foreign governments to abstain from acting in a manner that has been pro-
posed or threatened, and thus to repeal or modify enacted legislation, or
refrain from implementing enacted laws in a manner which would be detri-
mental to American economic interests. The precise nature of the demands
has been as varied as the entire range of governmental measures against
which representations have been directed, including legislative, executive
and administrative actions of all kinds.
Where loss or concrete injury has already been caused, the natural remedy
has been compensation and/or damages. The material on this topic is so
large that it cannot even be discussed here; it may be remarked merely that
differences of opinion as to the appropriateness of remedies demanded have
arisen almost exclusively with regard to compensation, reparation or damages.
Sometimes, and particularly in disputes concerning the interpretation
of contracts and concessions, the United States has called upon foreign nations
to settle the differences between them and the concessionaires in direct
negotiations. At other times, an initial request has been made merely for a
friendly settlement of some kind, and often only for agreement on a specific
procedure for settlement; among cases of the latter kind, requests for judicial
or arbitral examination of claims figure most prominently.
Lastly, it should be observed that among the remedies which are positive
in character is that of restitution in kind, which usually has been requested
in cases of taking of property. Furthermore, the extensive section above on
contract claims has shown that the United States has often insisted on specific
performance by foreign States of undertakings made in contracts vis-a-vis
American nationals.
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Generally, one may say that the most important end of diplomatic remedies
is speedy and complete relief and that, therefore, remedies like compensation
or damages have less importance than those which from a practical point
of view afford more direct and immediate protection to private investment.
Far from hesitating to make such demands, in the nature of injunctions or
specific performance, the United States has invoked them to the maximum
extent in its constant endeavor to render realistic and flexible protection to
American economic interests abroad.
CONCLUSION
The object of this study has been to show how, in support of the investments
and economic interests of American nationals, the power and prestige of the
United States has been brought into action in diplomacy vis-h-vis many
foreign nations.
The results obtained shed some light on what the position of customary
international law actually is in the area under review. In particular, it is
believed that some misconceptions have been dispelled as to what the practice
of the United States, and indirectly the practice of other States, has in fact
been.
The Foreign Relations present a vivid picture of the United States Govern-
ment actively engaged in enforcing the rights under international law of Amer-
ican citizens. While the first part of this paper demonstrates that the State
Department has displayed a certain restraint in rendering support in the estab-
lishment of investments, it has been observed that the reasons for such re-
straint do not and have not been deemed to apply in situations where existing
investments have needed protection. Yet there are overtones even in situations
of the latter kind of a certain caution which has found its most striking expres-
sion in the understandable reluctance of the United States to resort to force
and to sanctions of a comparable nature.
Another feature, difficult to delimit with exactitude, emerges from a study
of the diplomatic correspondence which has been examined. It may be ex-
pressed as a rule of reason. It evolves as a rather vague, yet tangible, rule
to the effect that, although the United States recognizes few doctrinal restric-
tions upon its right to intervene in support of any private American invest-
ment abroad, this right will be exercised only in circumstances when the
acts of the foreign government are unreasonable.
With necessity, the precise meaning and effect of this rule of reason will
vary from time to time and from case to case. It is not a hard and fast rule
but rather a general standard admitting of flexible interpretation. Thus,
evidently some measures which called for diplomatic protest a half-century
ago would now be viewed as admissible under international law and would
elicit no representations. Again, undoubtedly world opinion in the nineteen-
sixties will rule out the possibility of exercising a diplomacy entirely like
326 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
that employed in the beginning of the century. Nevertheless, the basic ap -
proach to the diplomatic protection of foreign investment will, it is believed,
remain essentially the same. This may perhaps be seen most clearly in situa-
tions where the legal relationship between the investor and a foreign State
has found expression in written terms and conditions which through negotia-
tion have become legally binding upon the parties and where, therefore, the
doctrines of eminent domain, police power, and the sovereign prerogatives
of the State arguably cannot be used in defense of measures which unreason-
ably infringe upon foreign investments.
This paper has yet another aim-to recall that the informal but vastly
important diplomatic intercourse between nations must be kept in mind
as the primary source of customary international law. That fact has been
ignored or overlooked in much of the recent debate on the status under
international law of private investments, whether or not made pursuant to
concessions, contracts or similar precise government assurances. The "case"
law evolved in diplomatic correspondence is too rich, too original and too
constructive to be neglected by scholars of international law.
